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In 19 39, at the beginning of the Franco regime, Spain
and the United States had few foreign policy relationships.
But beginning with the Pact of Madrid in 1953 and continuing
with the Agreement for Mutual Cooperation in 1970, Spain and
the U.S. moved to a bilateral mutually beneficial relation-
ship. The basic exchange has been American military and
economic aid in return for Spanish permission to maintain
American forces at four bases in Spain. While the U.S.
retains a strong influence on Spanish foreign policy, there
are increasingly important relationships between Spain and
Europe and with the Arab World. These latter two relation-
ships, and in particular the European link have caused Spain
to begin to shift some of its present dependence from the
U.S. to Europe in order to better realize its goals, i.e.
economic prosperity, international equality, security,
stability, the accession of Gibraltar, and protection of
its place in the Sahara. Therefore, even if the U.S. seeks
to maintain its military presence in Spain, the Franco or
post-Franco government will promote the integration of Spain
into Europe. This will probably mean decreased American
influence on Spanish policy and an uncertain prospect for
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I. INTRODUCTION
Since 1953, the United States has invested a significant
amount of time and resources in the building and maintaining
of military facilities on Spanish soil. The three air bases
at Torregon, Zaragoza, and Mor6n, and the naval base at Rota
are important elements of the defense structure of the United
States and the Western alliance. Under bilateral agreements,
these facilities belong to Spain; the United States leases
them for mutually agreed upon purposes.
The period from 1953 to the present has brought numerous
changes in the foreign policies of the two nations. The
United States desires to continue its use of Spanish military
facilities even though American policies and objectives have
changed over the years. The United States has adapted the
usage of the bases, within the limits of the agreements, to
fit the present conditions in Europe and the Mediterranean.
Spain, on the other hand, has been greatly affected by
its European, Mediterranean, and African neighbors. The
poles of Spanish foreign policy have evolved new relative
strengths as world events dictate new policies. The most
powerful, the integrative force of Europe, has shown a slow,
continual increase since 1945. The purpose of this thesis
is to examine and evaluate this trend toward European inte-
gration, and then determine how it will affect the U.S.
military presence in Spain.

Through the use of traditional historiographic research
and forecasting techniques, conclusions and most probable
courses of action will be arrived at relative to the Spanish
variables affecting foreign policy decisions. The research
is presented in a general context so as to allow unclassified
evaluations and conclusions.
The scope of the research will be confined to the major
events from the Spanish Civil War in 1936 to the 1975 base
rights negotiations; the reasons why the U.S. changed foreign
policies in 19 53; the evolution of Spanish foreign policy
and how it relates to U.S. objectives; and finally the fore-
cast of future possibilities for future U.S. - Spanish
agreements on the base rights issue.
In addition to the political science courses which are
part of the Naval Intelligence Curriculum at the Naval Post-
graduate School, and the survey of the literature pertaining
to Spanish-American relations, the author visited Washington
D.C. and Madrid, Spain for a two week period in order to
observe the international decision making process as well as
to become aware of recent events. The author benefited greatly
from the advice and opinions of the following individuals
who took time for interviews, telephone conversations, and
correspondence: Mr. Larry Pezzullo, Assistant to the Ambassa-
dor at Large, Robert McCloskey, Department of State; Mr.
Michael Durkey, Spanish Desk, Department of State; Mr. David
Simcox, Political Counselor, U.S. Embassy, Madrid, Spain;

Col. R.A. Bowen, Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense,
International Security Affairs, Pentagon; Cdr R. Rager,
Office of Chief of Naval Operations, Military-Political
Affairs OP-614 , Pentagon; and VADM Juan Carlos Munoz-Delgado
,
Spanish Navy, and BG Constantino Ortin, Spanish Army, at the
Naval Systems Management Center, Monterey Ca.
The views expressed herein are only those of the author
and do not represent those of the U.S. Navy or the Naval
Postgraduate School.

II. HISTORY OF SPANISH -AMERICAN RELATIONS
The period 1945-1953 brought radical changes to American
foreign policy toward Spain. In 1945 the United States and
its Allies had just won the most costly war ever waged. The
totalitarian governments of the Axis powers had been defeated
and the U.S. had adopted its traditional stance against dic-
tatorships. By 19 50, however, the United States had thrown
its support to General Franco's dictatorship in Spain. Why?
In order to answer this question, it is necessary to examine
Spanish-American relations beginning with the Spanish Civil
War. This war was a milestone in the modern history of Spain.
It brought the present Spanish government into power and set
the stage for American foreign policy toward Spain until
after World War II.
A. THE SPANISH CIVIL WAR
Modern Spanish-American relations began with the Spanish
Civil War, 1936-1939. The Republican government of Primo
de Rivera from 1931-1936 was weak and unable to satisfy the
desires of the landowner, businessmen, clergy, and generals,
or the needs of the workers and peasants. The Commander-in-
Chief of the revolutionary wing of the General union of Workers
(UGT) Largo Caballero led the laborers in their demands for
higher wages, education, land to till, better living condi-
tions, and the right to organize and to strike. Their discon-
tent unlocked the door of revolution which caused the rebellious
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General union of Officers (UME) under the leadership of
General Francisco Franco to revolt. His forces were known
as the Insurgents or Nationalists.
This internal war between Nationalists and Republicans,
also called loyalists, was a war of brother against brother.
It moved from village to city and throughout the entire
country. There was much bloodshed with atrocities committed
by both sides as women, children, priests, nuns, and others
were murdered until horror became a daily part of life. The
economy of Spain was completely destroyed as each side used
all resources available. Had the war been more swift so as
to have not depleted the nation's wealth, the warring sides
may not have found it necessary to seek foreign aid and in-
volvement. But as it resulted, the Nationalists were required
to accept aid from the Fascist governments of Italy and Ger-
many because other powers either found it politically advan-
tageous to remain neutral or were confident that support of
the Republican force was the safest policy.
The Soviet Union provided the Loyalists with some aid;
there was more interest in assisting the workers to establish
a sympathetic government. In an effort to safeguard the
Spanish gold reserve, Soviet officials convinced the Spanish
Minister of Finance, Doctor Negrin, to transfer 510,079,592
grams of gold from the Spanish treasury to Moscow. It arrived
the 6th of November 19 36 and has not been heard of since. [21
p. 516] Because this sizeable resource would have been of
11

great value to the victor of the Civil War in re-establishing
an economy, the Soviet's continued denial of its existence
has always been an alienating force.
The United States at this time was pursuing a policy of
isolation and did not support or provide aid to either side.
Toward the end of the Civil War, a public opinion poll taken
in the United States revealed that 76% favored the Republican
cause. [5 p. 10] This fact is important and should be kept
in mind as it had a profound influence on Americans until
1953.
The Nationalist force relied on German and Italian aid,
equipment, and personnel in their effort to overthrow the
existing government. Both of these donors saw Spain as a
potential ally as they assembled their power and assets.
Just as the Soviet Communists attempted to infiltrate the
war torn Spanish government through the labor movement, the
Germans and Italians used the military structure in prepara-
tion for future campaigns of greater import. General Franco's
forces prevailed and put a stop to the fighting. As the Spanish
Civil War was drawing to a close in 19 39, World War II was
in its infancy stage and General Franco was indebted to the
Axis powers. His accession to the Anti-Comintern Pact on
March 26, 1939, formalized Spain's debt. This was not a
military alliance, but it did commit Spain to political coopera-
tion with Germany, Italy, and Japan. Spain was an active
member under this pact until 1942. [66 p. 5]
12

The Spanish Civil War forced each nation of Europe to
take sides even if their official foreign policy was
neutralism. The war received a great amount of publicity
especially concerning the brutality and savage nature of
the contestants. Each reported event prompted reactions
from religious organizations, political parties, national
governments, ethnic communities, businessmen, and individual
leaders. The correct choice of the noblest cause was
extremely difficult. One of the most important factors
influencing this choice was Spain's association with the
Axis powers. There was no time to judge the new Franco
government on its own merits; the nations of Europe were
more worried about their own safety. General Franco was
hastily evaluated by using the friends he solicited as well
as the means by which he and his followers came to power.
Therefore, to sympathize with Franco and his Nationalist
cause was interpreted to be approval of Hitler and his goals.
General Franco was prejudged, as World War II began, to be a
fascist dictator who would surely follow in Hitler's foot-
steps. This would plague Franco throughout his reign as the
ruler of Spain.
B. WORLD WAR II
During the period following the Spanish Civil War, Franco
was very careful not to enter any bilateral type of military
alliance because of the inability of Spain to support any
such commitment. In light of the conflict that was certain
13

to break out in Europe in 1939, Franco brought Spain into
the Pact of Friendship with Germany, thereby assuring non-
aggression in return for Spain's neutrality. The agreement
was supplemented by secret pacts that gave Germany the use
of naval facilities in Spanish ports and a "cooperative"
role in relation to the Spanish police, press and
propaganda. [66 p. 5]
At the same time Franco conducted a personal campaign
against United States democracy as well as Soviet Union
communism. Since neither of these countries aided his
cause, he had no intention of aiding theirs, especially since
he believed that the Axis powers were the strongest. His
propaganda attacks were carried out mainly through his
influence in the Latin American countries which were
becoming very concerned about the degree of growth of
American influence and control in the individual countries.
This friendship with Latin America would prove to be useful
again when Spain later needed economic aid.
As World War II began to expand, General Franco was
decidedly pro-Axis; however, he was actually trying to
balance between both warring factions.
Until November 1942, so long as the tide of
victory ran in favor of the Axis, Spain played
her chosen role of pro-Axis neutral throughout,
though with varying degrees of vigor and in
constant readiness to jump into the fray as soon
as it was as good as won. What deterred her from
entering sooner was not only her own weakness and
the danger of retaliation to which this and her
geographic situation exposed her, but also her
dependence on anti-Axis powers, particularly
Great Britain and the United States, for essential




On June 14, 1940, when France was about to fall, Spain
informed Germany that she was ready to assist the Axis war
effort, but for a price. This price was the imperialistic
desire of Spain to control Gibraltar, French Morocco, a
slice of Algeria, and parts of the coast of Africa south
of Morocco. At this time Spain was evaluated to have an
army of 340,000 men who were in need of officers and ammuni-
tion, but otherwise ready and capable of waging a limited
War of short duration. Franco made this offer because of
his optimistic opinion that the end of the war was in
sight. [66 p. 8]
Hitler and Franco met in October of 1940 to discuss
Spain's participation in the war. Franco was promised only
Gibraltar; the other areas were left undiscussed. Neither
Hitler nor Mussolini were willing to pay the price Franco
demanded. Therefore, he cancelled all agreements. He
stated bluntly that if he was to be denied his aspiration
for Spanish expansion, then Germany could not use Spain as
a front for an attack on Gibraltar in order to control the
straits.
Later, when Germany attacked the Soviet Union, Franco
was delighted. Certainly now the war was almost over and
the Axis powers would be the victors. General Franco again
saw this as an excellent time, if not the last time, to enter
the war to reap some of the spoils. It was also a good time
to have some vengeance on the Soviet Union for its refusal
to return the Spanish gold deposited during the Civil War.
15

In July, 1941, Franco sent his Blue Legion of 14,000
volunteers to fight in the Leningrad front. [55 p. 10]
He also supplied a large Spanish labor force to Germany,
consisting of both skilled and unskilled workers. [21 p. 577]
This entire symbolic effort was in vain. In addition to the
loss of all but 8,000 men of the Blue Legion, the tide of
the war was beginning to turn. The Allied forces were
preparing to invade North Africa. Spain was becoming
surrounded by the Allied naval forces. General Franco began
to reconsider his position in the war and to instigate
reversals of his prior policies. "Henceforth his energies
were to be devoted almost impartially to working both sides
of the street while keeping Spain untouched by war."
[66 p. 12-13]
Prior to the Allied landings in North Africa in 1942,
President Roosevelt sent two persuasive letters to General
Franco emphasizing the fact that none of the actions of the
United States were against Spain or its areas of influence
and were not to be interpreted as such. He even attempted
to apologize for the recent denunciations of the Franco
regime by the American press. In short, President Roosevelt
was trying to keep Spain from any further participation in
the war and to preserve her neutrality for the best interest
of the Allied forces. Spain would not have a great affect
on the war even if total involvement occurred because of her
limited resources, but her entry would extend the length of
the European Campaign. Friendship was indicated in the form
16

of the salutation and the signature of the letter. These
communications were very clear illustrations of giving
military considerations priority over political factors.
This prefigured the position that was to be taken a decade
later when the agreement for base rights was concluded with
Spain. The only differences would be that the war would be
cold, not hot, and Franco's active cooperation would be
sought, not his neutrality. [66 p. 12-13]
This is an appropriate point to summarize the world
opinion of Spain. The following Post World War II section
presents the actions taken by the United Nations to isolate
Spain and the three factors which persuaded most of the
developed nations to reject Franco and his government. The
American mood was in keeping with this anti-Spain position.
C. POST WORLD WAR II
After the Allied victory in Europe, American as well as
world public opinion was very anti-Spain. General Franco
had tried to walk the narrow fence dividing the warring
factions during the latter part of the war, but had stepped
off occasionally violating his own neutrality. For his early
pro-Hitler position and his later failure to decidedly take
the Allied side, the Allies were not about to forgive him
even though there was sympathy with the oppressed Spanish
population. World opinion was made formal on December 12,
1946, when the General Assembly of the United Nations passed
the resolution which barred Spain from entry into the
17

organization on the grounds that its dictatorship form of
government was not peace loving. The resolution also called
for all the members to recall their ambassadors from Madrid.
Ironically, this motion was introduced by Poland which was
not considered to be an ideal example of a democratic form
of government. The United States and Great Britain were
dragged into the support of the resolution, but this was in
keeping with the sentiment of their general populations.
The United States conveniently complied with the resolution
by a previous unplanned event; the American Ambassador to
Spain, Mr. Norman Armour, resigned on November 11, 194 5.
[21 p. 598] No successor was appointed until December 27,
19 50 when President Truman sent Stanton Griff is as the
American Ambassador to Spain. James C. Dunn later replaced
Griff is in 19 53 when the newly elected President Eisenhower
took office.
American public opinion of Franco's Spain during this
post World War II period is of significant importance since
it set the stage for an understanding of the dilemma faced
by American decision makers as the new threats of the fifties
approached. Three general themes characterized this opinion
of Franco.
The first and most important cause of anti-Franco
sentiment which is still very important is the simple fact
that he is a dictator. The word and all it stands for is
unacceptable to Americans. This fear and dislike of
centralized authority goes all the way back in American
18

history to the early Republic. General Franco established
a dictatorship at the end of the Civil War and appeared to
have no intention of forsaking autocracy for democracy.
Individual rights and freedom had been sacrificed, but the
Spanish people in general were satisfied to have peace and
order restored. They believed that Franco was good for
Spain but not so in the eyes of Americans who had their
vision blurred by the ugly word "dictator."
The second factor was the means by which Franco came to
power. He had incurred a debt to Germany and Italy which
Americans assumed would be very binding and illustrative of
future support. In addition Franco had defeated a Loyalist
force with which a significant number of Americans were
sympathetic. Therefore, Americans disliked and distrusted
Franco because of how he had acquired his control over Spain.
The third influence on American opinion was Franco's
"fence walking" in World War II. His desire to keep the war
out of the already devastated Spain that was licking its
Civil War wounds as well as to be in a favorable position
with the victors was not an acceptable excuse for his lack
of total support for the Allied cause. This reason for
dislike of Franco is still present today. Franco is a
reminder of the suffering and destruction of World War II.
Isolation was to be Spain's punishment for Franco's decisions




As the political scientist Gabriel Almond pointed out
"The orientation of most Americans toward foreign policy
is one of mood, and mood is essentially an unstable
phenomenon." [2 p. 4 08] This mood can be predicted by
observing the character tendencies of the population and by
evaluating the presence or absence of a threat in the
internal or external political-economic situation. The
mood of the American people following World War II was
characterized by international security and concern for
internal problems. Spain certainly was not a topic of
conversation and was hardly considered important to the
powerful United States. However, in 1948, the Berlin crisis
and the perceived threat of communism would illustrate just
hew unstable the mood of America could be and how rapidly
foreign policy toward Spain could change.
20

III. SPANISH-AMERICAN BASE AGREEMENTS
The national interests of any nation must be continually
reviewed. So it was in the 19 50's, that as the United States
sought national security, all actions abroad were intended to
assist in securing these goals. Timely action necessary to
insure that our position as a nation is properly maintained
required policy reversals. The Cold War with the Soviet
Union placed new importance on the value of the Iberian
Peninsula. It had become a strategic location from which the
United States could defend its national interests.
In order to preserve its values, institutions, and
security against possible Sovient penetration, the United
States became involved in blending nations, political groups,
cultures, and religions of all kinds. The severity of the
threat forced America to choose a route counter to its
moralistic judgment and the opinion of Europe as it eased
into a mutual relationship with Spain.
The reasons why the United States entered into the
bilateral agreement with Spain in 19 53 known as the Pact of
Madrid provide a reference point from which present relations
may be examined. The mood of America changed during the late
1940 's as the perceived threat of communism became more
ominous. Therefore, it is appropriate to examine this mood
and its effects in order to understand why there was an
American foreign policy reversal toward Spain.
21

A. PACT OF MADRID 19 53
1 . United States Policy Change
In the post World War II period from 1947 to 1953,
the mood of most Americans toward foreign policy assumed
its changeable character. Americans traditionally view
international politics with indifference and withdrawal.
Their personal goals and interests usually take priority.
Indeed, this was the case immediately following the war.
The primacy of private and domestic values was reasserted.
Gabriel Almond stated that, "The pull of 'privatism 1 in
America creates a strong inclination to self-deception...".
[2 p. 409] This was the controlling force behind the
demobilization of the military establishment as well as some
of the wartime civilian bureaucracy. This overreaction of
the American mood was in itself very dangerous to the sense
of national security that existed during this temporary
stabilization of a world crisis. This was an excellent time
for communism under the vanguard of the Soviet Union to also
make a temporary tactical withdrawal to feed the deception
of the American mood
.
The political apathy of the population in the United
States immediately after the war was probably a direct result
of the concentration of energy on private competition.
Certainly the basic understanding of political policy was not
beyond the capability of the general population, it even may
have been less complicated than day to day business affairs.
There was, however, very little incentive to be interested
22

in foreign affairs unless the business of the individual
happened to be directly related to the foreign policy of
the United States toward a particular country. There was
a strong cultural incentive to develop policies and
strategies relating to personal business and professional
careers
.
However, in 194 7 both the American people and the
government began to realize that Russia was going to be a
future major foreign policy concern. Britain was in severe
economic condition and was unable to support a major presence
in the Mediterranean. Therefore, the United States could not
pursue complacency and isolation; new responsibilities had to
be assumed. Public opinion was brought to bear on the pre-
viously disregarded facts. Russia was still a dictatorship,
a police regime which feared and repressed all internal
opposition. Aggressive foreign policy decisions such as the
Marshall Plan and the Truman Plan began to draw strong public
support.
The communist offensive began shortly after the end
of the war. The Berlin crisis followed by the Soviet
development of the atomic bomb and the Korean conflict of
1950 convinced the United States and the rest of the West
that more than just a political threat was present. The
explosive nature of American public opinion would respond to




Gabriel Almond noted that "a foreign policy crisis,
short of the immediate threat of war, may transform
indifference to vague apprehension, to fatalism, to anger;
but the reaction is still a mood, a superficial and
fluctuating response." [2 p. 408] When there is a period of
political equilibrium, American attitudes toward foreign
policy tend to be vague and formless. During a crisis, this
attitude becomes more specific. The threat is over-
simplified as are the methods for coping with it. This
characteristic response during World War II reduced foreign
policy considerations to 'unconditional surrender' and
'win the war 1 . The early 19 50 's, however, brought a threat
that could not be simplified. Since the complex threat of
communism could not be simplified, the American attitude
could not be changed from its vague structureless base. The
reverse thought process questioned that if the threat could
not be dealt with using a simple method then the threat was
too complicated and not worthy of consideration. The
population was too busy with private affairs to be concerned
with the complexity of communism. They expected that the
government would handle the situation.
A complex problem may cause public opinion to produce
one of two adverse effects. There may be a withdrawal from
the problem if previous solutions have failed. For example,
at the end of World War II, the administration believed that
the communism problem could be dealt with best by good will
and the "man to man" approach. "The continued thwarting
24

of American overtures and concessions to the Russians now
seems to have produced an attitude of hopeless pessimism."
[2 p. 411] This caused an overall negative attitude toward
further negotiations and a withdrawal from further efforts
to bargain with the Russians. There is also the possibility
of hasty reactions motivated by irritation and impatience.
[2 p. 412]
The national security of the United States, as well
as the rest of the non-communist world, was being directly
threatened. Isolation was no longer the foreign policy of
the United States; new strategic policies now called for
rearmament and expansion of strategic military bases to
counter any new communist efforts.
The American public was no longer apathetic toward
foreign affairs. The memory of Pearl Harbor impelled
Americans to demand that protective measures be taken and
that national security policies be reviewed. The new concept
of nuclear deterrence was born; large conventional forces
could be reduced by the use of a credible nuclear delivery
system that would prevent an attack by the opposing force.
The question now was how to deploy such a system and would
it in fact counter the threat.
In light of the new communist threat and the residual
dislike of General Franco, it hardly seemed likely that the
United States would find Spain to be of any value. However,
military advisors were very eager to voice their opinions as
to the benefits that Spain could provide to the security of
25

the United States. These opinions were presented in the
form of a paper submitted by the Chief of Naval Operations,
Admiral Sherman, to the Secretary of State.
Spain is ideally situated to control the Mediter-
ranean Sea and provide a stepping stone to Europe. The
Iberian peninsula is surrounded by water on all sides except
the connection to Europe which is protected by the Pyrenees
Mountains.
Within her territory Spain has more than enough
practicable sites for airfields, and plenty of
manpower for putting them into shape. She has
good harbors both on the Atlantic and the
Mediterranean for bringing in essential supplies
to troops. Weather conditions for use of her
airfields, too, are better on the average than
in most countries. [4 p. 350]
The airfields in Spain would not be any closer to the Soviet
Union than those in North Africa for purposes of bombing
missions, but they would be advantageous for tactical
support of military forces in the Mediterranean area. The
acquisition of bases in Spain would add another link to the
global security network that the United States was building.
They would provide an excellent location to replenish the
Sixth Fleet as well as control the entrance to the
Mediterranean Sea.
The conclusion was reached that Spain was valuable
to the United States mainly because of its geographic
location. At this time the Spanish military was not
considered to be important or relevant to the value decision
concerning Spain. The Spanish military, which forms the
26

backbone of the Franco regime, was almost too large for
the country to support. Men were needed in agriculture and
industry to save the economy. Although the Spanish Army
had antiquated weapons and equipment/ they were well
organized and trained in the use of the resources available
to them; but they were hardly a viable force if faced with
a modern mechanized enemy. Ports, airfields, roads,
railroads, and communication channels were in an unsatis-
factory state. Excessive reconstruction would be necessary
to make Spain a valuable asset for general purpose warfare
.
This would include a complete modernization of the armed
forces with new equipment and associated training. As it
resulted, this modernization was part of the price Franco
later placed on the establishment of American bases in Spair,
The United States military, in particular the Air
Force and the Navy, began to use their persuasive efforts
to illustrate the necessity for bases in Spain. This
professional analysis of the strategic value of Spain
influenced Congress to begin considering this country as an
asset to the defense of the West. The recommendations
presented by the military, however, did not include provisions
for the means to accomplish this goal. They were interested
in Spain only as a valuable strategic location for airfields
and a naval base, which could serve as a replenishment site
for the Mediterranean Fleet. Cost was also excluded from
their considerations since the severity of the threat would
support the probable massive expenditure necessary for the
27

complete modernization of existing Spanish military instal-
lations. The value of the end would justify the cost. In
effect, the perceived necessity for bases in Spain fostered
a major foreign policy reversal by the United States. In
1950 the United States was also attempting to consolidate
the North Atlantic community against Soviet communist
expansion. Spain belonged to this community because of its
geographic position, its history, and its strong anti-
communist orientation. The dictatorship form of government,
however, was still an area of disagreement and displeasure
among the other community members. The United States was
forced to deal with Spain bilaterally. The Europeans had
not forgotten nor forgiven Franco.
Circumstances also persuaded Spain to change its
foreign policy. The cumulative effects of imposed European
and self isolation, bad weather, and poverty made it very
difficult for Franco to build a new Spain. The United
States was helping to rebuild Europe while at the same time
trying to contain communism. Since Franco realized that
Spain could not make it on its own, he began to seek American
aid; in return he was willing to allow the United States to
construct military facilities on Spanish soil.
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General Franco's political strategy is as simple
as a spear. Every action of his aims at only one
achievement: to stay on. Under the most varied
and even contradictory tactical appearances —
peace, neutrality, warmongery, amnesty, persecution,
monarchy, regency — General Franco has one and only
one thought: General Franco. [21 p. 59 3]
This personal dictatorship has greatly affected
the political, economic, and military development of Spain.
His foreign policy has been in conflict with the Communist
Bloc as well as the Western Allies.
In 1947 Franco was now politically secure within
Spain, but he continued to be beset with difficulties in
the world beyond. For the most part they were economic.
[51 p. 206] The Civil War and World War II left Spain in
poverty which intensified every year. Not only were most
goods in short supply, but the means of distribution were
in very poor condition. The black market was growing, as
was the cost of living. Corruption was even considered
to be a necessary evil.
Unseasonably bad weather in 1945 critically affected
agriculture as well as power production as a result of a
severe drought. In addition to these natural calamities,
Spain had to contend with its unfriendly relations with
numerous nations. In particular, France closed its border
in March of 194 6 for two years. Britain and the United
States made it clear that no sympathy would be shown toward
Spain. Spain was now suffering because of the fluctuating
manner in which Franco dictated foreign policy. [51 p. 207]
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General Franco was thought of by his population to
be either a hero or a necessary evil. He had brought the
nation out of the Civil War and had maintained stability;
he was the only alternative to anarchy. Many factions
wanted Franco to step down and have a monarch reinstalled,
but this included the unanswered question of who would be
king. Most of the Spanish population had vivid memories
of the chaos of the Civil War and had no desire to have it
happen again.
Franco gained the support of the people even as the
foreign propaganda was directed toward Spain. He used this
onslaught of world opinion to his advantage to arouse
national support of his firm international policy (firm in
the sense that it was stable until he changed his mind)
.
The pride of the Spanish people and their resentment of
foreigners were the embers he fanned. After the United
Nations had made its judgment of Franco , Spain withdrew into
itself. The external attacks were a benefit to Franco's
internal politics. [51 p. 203-204]
Spain was befriended by a few nations. The good
relation with Argentina was very important during the problem
period immediately following World War II. She provided
Spain with a source of badly needed wheat. Argentina also
provided moral support to Spain in her solitary stance
against the unfriendliness of the major powers. However,
the poverty situation in Spain delayed repayment of the
extensive credit agreements; an imbalance of trade continued
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to grow mainly due to the lack of industrial capacity in
Spain to produce manufactured goods that Argentina desired.
Because of rising internal problems, Argentina was forced
to discontinue financial aid to Spain in 1949.
Franco now turned to the United States to provide
a foundation for economic growth in Spain. He carefully
began a lobby effort to gain support for his cause.
Economics had forced Franco to reverse his previous foreign
policy. Also, in 1948 the events of the world had created
a climate advantageous to Franco's goals; the Soviet Union
was now a common opponent of both the United States and
Spain. [51 p. 208-210]
In approaching the United States on matters of aid,
General Franco also had to keep in mind the fact that
European opinion had an influence on American policy.
Although Franco had been strongly opposed to communism
since the beginning of his administration, this position
did not help his relations with Britain and France. These
relations were already strained by Franco's territorial
aspirations. Because of this alienation by both the East
and the West, Spain was excluded from the United Nations,




Resentment in Europe led to the feeling that the
character and record of the Spanish regime,
despite its staunch anti-Communist attitude,
could not be reconciled with the general purposes
for which the members of the North Atlantic
Treaty had united. The presence of Spain, it
felt, would merely prove a source of embarrassment
and a weakness in the ideological struggle with
Soviet communism. [17 p. 228]
Neither Britain nor France were willing to contribute to
the modernization of the Spanish economy or to develop a
useful anti-communist military force since Franco might use
this aid to further his territorial ambitions.
Therefore, the United States was the only power with
whom Franco felt that there was any chance of successful
bargaining. He was now very willing to allow American bases
to be constructed on Spanish soil as long as he received the
economic aid needed and possibly the commitment of United
States forces to the defense of Spain.
3 . Spain and United States Agree
The Eisenhower administration met the threats of
communism head on. The nuclear strength of the United
States was very important to the balance of world power
within the concept of deterrence. Overseas facilities were
needed to place the Soviet Union within striking distance
as well as for the defense of Europe. The United States
was, therefore, anxious to conclude the agreement with Spain
In addition to the military provisions of the agreement,
there was also a significant amount of United States aid
involved. The two nations were satisfied, but of course
there were some remaining adverse opinions on both sides.
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In 1953 National Security Council memorandum
No. 162 (NSC 162) which was started during the Truman
administration presented the "new look" of the Eisenhower
administration. The Soviet possession of the atomic bomb
and the loss of China to communism emphasized the require-
ment that the United States must be prepared to meet a
powerful threat. Domestic factors also contributed to the
formulation of NSC 162. The administration was under
pressure to reduce expenditures and taxes, and to balance
the budget. This presented the problem of how to increase
military defenses and yet reduce the budget and maintain
economic stability.
NSC 162 assumed that at this time the United States
and the Soviet Union were in parity because the United
States had a credible nuclear weapon delivery system and
the Soviet Union had a large general purpose force. There-
fore, the United States concluded that it was more economical
to rely on its nuclear deterrent than try to maintain a
large counter general purpose force. This view was extended
to include the return of soldiers from Korea and Europe
to form a large reserve force which was similar to the
previous mobilization theory. NSC 162 also contained four
other assumptions: (1) There would be no significant
increase in the international tension level; (2) There
would be no significant change in the ratio of U.S. and
U.S.S.R. power; (3) Massive nuclear retaliation would be
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the deterrent to massive or limited war; (4) Nuclear
weapons would be used in any war.
During this period of the Cold War, the United
States was at its high water mark of power. This meant
that any move by the Soviet Union toward Western Europe
would require a nuclear response since this was the only
immediate force available. To make this position very
clear, the United States openly solicited the use of air
bases in Spain to station strategic bombers. This was only
one of the reasons for the American desire to have military
bases in Spain, but is was the most dramatic.
The Pact of Madrid was signed in Madrid, Spain on
September 26, 1953 by Don Alberto Martin Artajo, the Spanish
Foreign Minister, and by James C. Dunn, the United States
Ambassador to Spain at this time. It was the result of
negotiations which were initiated by exploratory conversa-
tions by Admiral Sherman, Chief of Naval Operations, and
General Francisco Franco on July 16, 19 51. The preamble
of the agreement stresses the threat of communism and how
Spain and the United States are working to preserve peace.
PREAMBLE
Faced with the danger that threatens the western
world, the Governments of the United States and
Spain, desiring to contribute to the maintenance
of international peace and security through
foresighted measures which will increase their
capability and that of the other nations which
dedicate their efforts to the same high purposes
to participate effectively in agreements for
self defense. [55 p. 435-436]
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The Pact of Madrid was an executive agreement
between the President of the United States and General
Franco. Since it was not a treaty, there was no necessity
to have it ratified by the Senate. The executive agreement
power first became important during the Franklin D. Roosevelt
administration. Both Congress and the federal judiciary
approved the use of this less formal type of agreement mainly
in the establishment of aid and assistance programs. The
type of international agreement to be used is now the
prerogative of the President. If the agreement is to be
very formal and is very unlikely of receiving censorship in
the Senate, it will probably be submitted as a treaty. But
as in most situations, the easiest course of action for the
Executive Department is to use the executive agreement
format thereby by-passing the ratification process.
The bilateral agreement with Spain was designed
"... to strengthen the capabilities of the West for the
maintenance of international peace and security." [55 p. 4 35-
4 36] The Pact consisted of three mutually beneficial inter-
dependent agreements. The central document is the Defense
Agreement
.
It authorized the development, maintenance, and
utilization of certain unspecified bases by the
United States, jointly with the Spanish government.
It stipulates that the bases shall remain under the
'sovereign' and the 'flag and command' of Spain and
that 'the time and manner of (their) war time
utilization ... will be as mutually agreed upon.'
It authorized the United States to station in Spain
the necessary supplies and equipment, operate the
necessary facilities, and exercise the necessary
supervision over personnel, facilities, and
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equipment. Finally it provided that the agreement
should remain in force 'for a period of ten years,
automatically extended for two successive periods
of five years each, ' unless terminated according
to a specified procedure. [66 p. 45]
Under the provisions of the Military Security Act
Agreement, Spain was to receive a total of $226 million
during the fiscal year 1954. This amount was divided into
$85 million for defense-support assistance and $141 million
for military end-item assistance. Over half of the total
aid to be given was a carry over of money already appro-
priated for economic aid to Spain in 1951 and 1952. These
appropriations were obtained by the Spanish lobby; the actual
aid was never allocated. This $125 million was divided into
two categories. The first was $50 million for military
equipment. The remaining $75 million was more economy
oriented in so far as it was to finance Spanish imports of
raw materials and equipment, and to provide technical
assistance to effectively implement modern economic tech-
niques. Congress appropriated the remaining $101 million
in 1954; this was also divided into military equipment
purchase for $91 million and $10 million for defense support
assistance. [55 p. 435-436]
The Pact of Madrid met with strong opposition in
Spain. There was a fear that Spain would become a satellite
of American influence. For this reason the agreement
contained strict rules for the conduct of American personnel
stationed in Spain. This was done to prevent anti-American
incidents. The Spanish people generally disliked the
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'ugly American' who had more money than manners and indeed
little respect for the old civilizations of Europe. Also
the American was thought of as being Protestant. The Spanish
people felt that their Catholic values were endangered by
the American religious precepts which were painted with
money. The powerful position of the Catholic Church of
Spain fashioned the entire population both spiritually and
politically. In return for this privileged position, Franco
was given the Church's total support. [51 p. 219]
The American population was also opposed to the
agreement because of the adverse public opinion of Franco's
form of government, historical associations, and anti-
democratic outbursts. The people were not ready to
legitimize the State's decision which ran counter to their
morality in the cultural context. The United States was
still faced with the dilemma of a decision involving the
fear of communism versus the morality of the population.
Spanish-American relations from 1953 to 1968 were
stable. The provisions of the Pact of Madrid were instituted
and honored by both sides. The bases were built; military
and economic aid began to bring prosperity to Spain.
4. The Period from 1953-1968
The basic program of the 19 53 agreement was to be
completed by June 1958. On September 23, 1956 the air base
at Torrej6n became the first United States facility to be
opened. The pivot point of the entire program was the
naval base at Rota. This was to be the headquarters of the
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Sixth Fleet. This installation was expected to cost over
$120 million, of the total $400 million allotted for base
construction. (See Figure 1 for the location of the bases
at Torre j6n, Zaragoza, Mor6n, and Rota.)
As the program developed and the bases were being
built, relations between Spain and the United States were
very good with the exception of a few occasions when
American officials gave the impression that the United
States had unlimited rights concerning the usage of the
bases. Spain made it very clear that it had the right to
control how the bases were to be used.
The 19 6 3 renewal of the base rights agreement was
important to the United States because it was hoped that
nuclear powered submarines equipped with Polaris missiles
could be based at the naval base at Rota. After hard
bargaining, a five year renewal was signed, the United
States contracted to furnish more dollar assistance and
military aid. Shortly after the renewal, the Pentagon
decided upon gradual withdrawal from strategic bomber bases
in Spain, while holding on to the key Rota facility for use
by a nuclear submarine squadron. The bombers had served
their purpose; now air and logistic support would be the
major air force missions in Spain.
Since the 1953-1968 period was stable concerning
Spanish-American relations, it is appropriate to move on to
the important 1968-1970 negotiation period. The national








1970 Agreement of Friendship and Cooperation Between the
United States and Spain came into being, and how these same
issues may affect subsequent negotiations.
B. THE AGREEMENT OF FRIENDSHIP AND COOPERATION
BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND SPAIN, 1970
The bilateral agreement signed by the United States and
Spain on September 26, 1953, began a new era of cooperation
between the two nations. The United States, seeking
national security while in a cold war with communism, and
Spain, seeking world recognition and aid in order to build
for the future, sought one another to bargain with their
resources to best meet their individual needs. Two very
dissimilar governments, a democracy and a dictatorship, made
a bilateral agreement which has continued in general meaning
for twenty years.
The original Defense Agreement contained the provision
that it would remain in effect for ten years, after which
it could be renewed twice for periods of five years each.
In 1963 the first renewal became effective within the time
period allotted for negotiations. However, in 1968 the
renewal did not operate with the previous efficiency.
Twice the two nations agreed to extend the joint operation
of the air and naval bases for one year following the
expiration of the agreement in September 1968. The last
extension was to expire on September 26, 1970. [27 May 15,
1970, 15:1] Both nations felt that time was not as critical
as it was for the 1953 agreement; the United States was not
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frantically trying to defend itself and Spain was not in
any economic crisis. However, each nation still had assets
and resources for which it was worth bargaining. Spain
considered that its position was the controlling factor;
the United States must simply pay the price. The goals were
set high and allowance for compromise was small. There was
time to be careful in seeking the maximum return for the
required investment.
Negotiations were delayed because of two key issues:
(1) Spain wanted a defense treaty with a commitment of
United States forces. (2) Spain wanted $1 billion in aid
and military assistance. The United States was only
interested in maintaining the right to jointly use Spanish
military facilities. Therefore, the essential point to be
negotiated was how much it was going to cost the United
States to use these facilities for five more years.
1. United States Need for Bases in Spain 1970
The United States no longer needed Spanish bases
for stationing bombers near the Soviet Union; but the bases
were still required for other reasons. Mr. George W. Landau
from the Department of State stated that "We need our bases
and military facilities in Spain, since these are essential
to the projection of U.S. power and ultimately the credi-
bility of our deterrent capability in the Mediterranean."
[53 p. 218] For example the bases were used during the
Lebanon crisis in 1958, the Congo air lift in 1961, and the
evacuation of United States personnel during the 1967 Middle
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East crisis. Mr. Landau went on to summarize the function
of the American bases by stating, "... all of our facilities
in Spain are defensive and deterrent in nature and will
contribute to maintenance of peace and avoidance of
conflict." [53 p. 249] The very nature of this function
makes it easy for opponents to believe that these facilities
are not really necessary and definitely not worth the rental
fee because there is seemingly no visible threat to American
security; the United States would appear to be overprotective
at the tax payers 1 expense. But it must be noted that our
strategic posture in light of other base closures had been
reduced already. The essential role of Spanish bases
continued to grow in significance as Soviet presence in the
Mediterranean steadily increased.
The United States had approximately 8000 military
personnel and 13,000 dependents stationed in Spain at four
bases: Rota, Torrejdn, Zaragoza, and Mordn. [42 p. 175]
The naval base at Rota supported a squadron of
Polaris submarines as well as many of the ships of the
Sixth Fleet on an irregular basis. It served as a base for
naval reconnaissance aircraft. There was also a small naval
communication facility located at the naval base.
The air base at Torrejdn near Madrid was the home
base for a wing of F-4 aircraft, detachments of which were
deployed forward to Italy and Turkey. It was also a





The closing of the Air Force Base at Wheelus Field
in Libya, required that the base at Zaragoza in north eastern
Spain be reactivated. The training range at the near by
Barbenas Reales was now essential to the readiness of our
European based air forces in Germany, England, Turkey, and
Italy. The fair weather of Zaragoza made it possible to
conduct continuous pilot training. No other air base in
Europe had this potential. The training conducted here was
in strict accordance with the bilateral agreement; but
naturally since the United States Air Force was a major
contributor to NATO strength, the overall readiness of this
alliance was benefited by the use of this training facility.
[53 p. 219-220]
Since 19 70, Moron Air Base near Rota in south western
Spain has been officially in a standby status. Five hundred
personnel are still assigned to the facility to maintain its
condition. [42 p. 175]
In fiscal 1970 the operating costs of American-used
facilities in Spain was $90 million. This includes the costs
related to the support of the 55 personnel in the Military
Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) . [42 p. 175]
Spain in return received an estimated $35 to $38
million income from the American presence. This was in
addition to the aid provided as stipulated in the base agree-
ment. The income had an economic impact mainly on the immedi-
ate surrounding area of each base. It was not a vital source
of income for the nation which had an estimated 25 million
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tourists annually. [53 p. 226] This associated income,
therefore, was a bargaining factor for the United States
only in the context of the economic welfare of the community
in proximity to the American used facilities.
Negotiations began in 1968 to renew the old agreement,
but efforts were soon altered by the consideration of an
entirely new agreement and possibly a treaty. Spain con-
tinually stressed that she was exposing herself to attack
by granting the United States the use of Spanish facilities.
In return for Spanish cooperation, the United States continued
to refuse to make any defense commitment to guarantee the
security of the host nation. In fact, Washington attempted
to pass this responsibility on to NATO by reviving European
interest in granting Spanish admission. This proposal was
soundly overruled at the NATO conference in Rome in May 19 70,
by the Northern European countries. They kept their tradi-
tional position that democracy in Spain was required before
admission. [27 May 28, 1970, 12:1]
Spain is party to only one actual mutual defense
agreement. Portugal and Spain signed the Iberian Pact in
1942. Spain has a military agreement with France which was
signed in June 19 70, but it does not cover mutual defense.
[53 p. 235]
The principal difficulty facing a new agreement on
the American usage of Spanish facilities was the reluctance
of the United States to give even a vaguely worded security
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commitment. Spain was forced to abandon any hope for a
mutual defense treaty because of the adverse effect that
the Vietnam War had on American willingness to make any
overseas commitments. Spain, therefore, had to try instead
to attain a less formal type of commitment, which most
probably would mean another executive agreement similar
in form to the original Pact of Madrid.
The previous 19 6 3 agreement contained a declaration
that an attack on either country would be a matter of
"common concern." Even this was too binding as interpreted
by Congress that was very concerned with popular opinion in
regards to commitments abroad. [2 7 May 28, 19 70, 12:1] In
19 70 the United States was still involved in the vague
commitment controversy concerning the American position in
Indochina. The legality and constitutionality of the
commitment was being subjected to long and bitter debates.
In spite of this lesson in international relations, the
Nixon administration, apart from Congressional participation,
proceeded with another vague agreement with Spain [2 7 July
28, 1970, 30:1]
Spain's other tactic was to press for aid and
assistance both military and non-military commensurate with
risks of attack involved. The military aid would be used
to modernize Spanish forces so as to enable them to be able
to defend themselves. Spain originally suggested a list of
equipment whose value was estimated at over a billion
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dollars. This was considered excessive by the United
States. The expected total value of military aid to be
offered to Spain was $100 to $125 million. [27 May 28, 1970,
12:1]
Spain expected to get either a specific commitment
or a vague commitment augmented by a significant amount of
aid, but they did not expect to get both.
In 19 70 the United States government took the
position of officially encouraging Spain to continue to
seek closer relations with western Europe, including the
eventual membership in NATO. This was standard policy for
the United States to show official endorsement of Spanish
economic progress. [57 p. 19] However, there seems to be
an underlying assumption that this position is valid as long
as the Spanish dependence on the United States remains. If
negotiations were to fail to produce a new agreement, Spain
would not be out in the cold as would have been the case in
1953 and possibly 1963. The economy was greatly strengthened
by tourist trade and foreign investment. Spain had begun the
process of economic integration into the European community.
The worst that could happen if the negotiations failed would
be a blow to the international status of Spain. Other
recent events had already made their mark.
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Efforts to improve relations with eastern Europe
have so far resulted only in five consular
agreements; long negotiations with the European
Economic Community have produced only a trade
agreement; and while Spain's special relationship
with the Arab states is as rich as ever in
flowery rhetoric, it has failed to avert an
embarrassing quarrel with Morocco over the
phosphate-dusted future of the Spanish Sahara.
[25 p. 31]
All of these apparent setbacks are actually only a slow
down of areas of advancement relative to the Spanish
isolation of the 1950 's.
2 . United States Negotiation Difficulties
The positions and the goals of the two nations have
been presented. The discussion will now concentrate on
specific areas in which difficulties arose during negotiations
and the factors which caused them. The actual text of the
19 70 Agreement of Friendship and Cooperation was not
released until it was signed on August 6, 1970. References
to the agreement and the opposition to it from both United
States and Spanish sources, therefore, were based on partial
knowledge, rumors, and most probable courses of action.
As of May 1970, the Nixon administration had not
discussed the new agreement with the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee for the preceding six months. The administration
was going to wait at least until the withdrawal of all
American troops from Cambodia which was due on June 30, 19 70,
before raising again the Spanish Matter. [27 May 25, 1970,




As in the case of previous Spanish-American negotia-
tions, there was opposition to the entire idea because it
involved association with the Franco autocratic regime.
Should the United States place its long range interests in
the hands of a 77 year old dictator who is coming under
increasing opposition and who does not consult the repre-
sentatives of the people before commiting his nation? This
position was put forth by individuals and newspapers that
were convinced that overseas projection of United States
power should not be dependent upon the Franco regime
.
The 19 70 agreement was delayed because of the degree
of United States commitment as well as the legitimacy of the
actual executive agreement procedure. Key members of the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee began to raise questions
relating to these two areas which eventually led to debating
in the Senate concerning the relationship of the President
and the Congress on setting foreign policy. [27 May 25, 1970,
15:1]
On July 24, 1970 after the State Department had
completed basic negotiations for the new base agreement,
the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, U. Alexis
Johnson, and the Deputy Secretary of Defense, David Packard,
briefed the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. There was
an immediate adverse reaction from the committee because of
the vague wording proposed concerning the American commitment
[27 July 25, 1970, 2:5] The actual wording will be discussed
later in this paper.
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Senator J. W. Fulbright, the Foreign Relations
Committee Chairman, became very concerned about the form of
the new agreement. He stated that "... an agreement of 'such
great potential importance' should take the form of a treaty
which requires Senate ratification, rather than an Executive
agreement between the two Governments." [27 July 25, 19 70,
2:5] Since the Executive agreement does not require Senate
approval, any commitment between the United States and Spain
cannot be construed to have national legitimacy. This
position would be clarified by the Senate on
#
December 6, 1970
in conjunction with action taken on Resolution 469 which
stated that the Senate had no part in the agreement and that
there was no American commitment in it.
Senator Fulbright was also concerned about the hidden
costs of the new agreement which he had estimated would be as
high as $400 million. This estimate included the value of
the naval vessels that were to be loaned to Spain plus the
value of the bases and other equipment that was to be given
away. [27 August 3, 19 70, 7:1]
On August 2, 19 70, Senator J. W. Fulbright announced
that he would seek through legislation to block the new
agreement unless it was submitted to the Senate as a treaty.
He demanded that an orderly representative process be used
to insure that the form and the content of the agreement
was in the national interest and that it would be agreeable
to the majority. Senator Fulbright 's "... proposal is to
offer an amendment to the military procurement authorization
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bill, now before the Senate , specifying that the Executive
branch can spend no funds for troops or use of military
bases in Spain except as a result of 'affirmative action
taken by the executive and legislative branches through
means of a treaty or convention." 1 [27 August 3/ 1970, 7:1]
After nearly two years of negotiations delayed by Spanish
demands for an American commitment or more aid, the
administration was now faced with a very serious domestic
threat to the proposed agreement.
In light of this new attack on the base agreement
by Senator Fulbright, the administration decided to rush
for a signature as soon as possible. They also refused to
make public the text of the new agreement until after the
signing. These two actions have led to an even wider- gulf
between the executive and legislative branches concerning
responsibility for making foreign military commitments.
3 . Spanish Negotiation Difficulties
Spain also had internal difficulties which threatened
to disrupt the negotiation of the 19 70 agreement. Even under
the dictatorship of Franco, there was opposition to his
foreign policies. There was also a general anti-American
feeling in Spain caused by diplomatic errors, the Vietnam
conflict, and the neutral United States position on Gibraltar
The combination of these factors added to the complexity of




During the base agreement discussions, the Spanish
opposition represented by influential figures from the
liberals, Socialists, Christian Democrats, and monarchists
made a very concerted effort to present a solid front
against Franco and in sympathy with the victimized population
Under the general leadership of Jose Maria de Areilza, the
Count of Montrico and former Spanish ambassador, this group
pursued a very dangerous approach to reform in light of the
government policies of strict censorship and limited
toleration of divergent political thought. The question of
American presence in Spain was used as a banner to rally
nationalistic support.
The attempts by the opposition to publish articles
and to meet with foreign officials were met with resistance
by the government as well as constant surveillance and
suspicion which often resulted in court action and fines,
which was the minimum punitive action usually administered.
As an example, in response to efforts by the Count of
Montrico and the opposition to meet with Secretary of State
William Rogers when he visited Spain in May 1970, the
government confiscated the Count's diplomatic passport and
subjected him to police questioning. [27 June 11, 1970, 3:1]
The previously mentioned trip of Secretary of State
Rogers was significant for two reasons. The first was
related to the length of the visit. On May 30, 1970 after
two years of negotiations, that Spain considered to be very
important, he spent only 2 3 hours in Spain. The press was
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very quick to air government as well as opposition
displeasure with this apparent lack of concern on the part
of the United States. Semi-official papers expressed the
desire of the Spanish Government "... that Spain be treated
as an equal in any new base agreement and be given
guarantees to compensate for the risks run in allowing
the bases to remain." [27 May 31, 1970, 2:6] The United
States had offended the Spanish pride. This single factor
is of extreme importance in any relationship with Spain.
Pride is a strong binding force which can be used advanta-
geously or it can have very detrimental effects on future
cooperation. The American cultural context often does not
understand foreign responses to "minor" offenses. To offend
Spanish pride by neglecting equality and formality is bound
to adversely affect the negotiation process.
The second significant factor of Secretary Roger's
trip involved his relationship with the Spanish opposition.
He was faced with the problem of whether or not to meet
with the opposition. They had a petition signed by 12
sympathizers, which they desired to deliver in person to
Mr. Rogers. The substance of this petition was a basic
statement of their position on the agreement. Even though
they used anti-American campaign procedures, they stated
that they were not as interested in the use of the bases by
the United States as they were in the fact that the Spanish
pwople were not consulted in the making of the decision.
[27 June 11, 1970, 3:1]
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Secretary of State Rogers declined the request for
an appointment and had the suggestion relayed to them that
they should mail the petition to his office. Since
recognition of any kind would be very dangerous to the
United States position, Mr. Rogers really did not have a
choice. The Spanish government watched the situation very
carefully. Later they threatened to break off negotiations
if any official United States recognition was given to the
opposition. The petition was given to a member of Mr. Roger's
party and later delivered to him.
The democratic opposition was naturally very critical
of the American administration after this event for its lack
of concern for their opinion and for the continued American
willingness to give military and economic support to the
Franco regime. The opposition also stated that this
American position had strengthened anti-Americanism in Spain
which had already been accelerated by their displeasure
concerning American participation in the Vietnam conflict.
[25 p. 31]
The Spanish opposition viewed the Senatorial
conflict over the agreement with optimism. If this could
cause the agreement not to be signed, the opposition would
gain influence, since removing the Americans was part of
their campaign for popular support.
The dispute over the Spanish claim to Gibraltar had
an indirect effect on the base agreement negotiation. Much
to the displeasure of Spain, the United States did not take
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the Spanish side against Gibraltar and Britain. In fact,
the United States remained neutral on the matter which was
obviously the safest position since any action would offend
either Britain or Spain. But from Spain's point of view the
United States simply was not providing proper political sup-
port. Spain was hoping for United States support since the
base agreement was in a tenuous extension period. By remaining
neutral, the United States angered the Spanish government,
but remained on good relations with Britain. Negotiations,
therefore, dragged on as Spain refused to decrease her demands.
This continued until it was obvious that possible action by
the United States Senate may completely cancel the negotiations
and Spain could possibly lose her bargaining position.
The most important aspect of the Gibraltar question
was how Franco used it. In the summer of 1969, he completely
closed the border between Spain and Gibraltar. This climaxed
a careful diplomatic and political campaign by Franco to rally
support for his government under the banner of nationalism.
The nation was united in its demand that Gibraltar be returned
to Spain. In addition, the continual placing of restrictions
on Gibraltar and the eventual isolation was a carefully planned
method by which Franco could display his dislike of the British
Labor Party and its leader Harold Wilson. [51 p. 252]
In connection with this Gibraltar question, it is
interesting to note that the news coverage of the signing of
the base agreement in 19 70 attracted very little attention
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from the British press. A very small article appeared in the
Friday, August 7 edition of The Times . This was indicative of
the general attitude of the Labor Party. Spain was a political
thorn in their side because of Gibraltar. Franco's never end-
ing campaign to gain control of this small strategic location
usually kept the two nations politically at odds. Britain
had just undergone an election in June 1970, in which the
Labor Party was defeated; this might also explain the indiffer-
ence .
In spite of the lengthy negotiations which were plagued
by difficulties, an agreement was finally reached. Since the
provisions of this agreement are in effect now, a discussion
of the important points will be presented in order to under-
stand the probable changes to be incorporated in future agree-
ments. It is also important to consider how well this agreement
was received by both nations.
4 . The Agreement is Signed
The Agreement of Friendship and Cooperation between
the United States and Spain was signed in Washington, D.C. on
August 6, 19 70 by the Spanish Foreign Minister Gregorio Lopez
Bravo and Secretary of State William P. Rogers. [60 p. 237]
It replaced the Defense Agreement of 1953 and its extensions.
This new agreement provided for a much broader and construc-
tive relationship between the two nations than the previous
agreement. In addition to the specific defense related items,
it included cooperation in such non-military fields as space,
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educational exchange, science and technology, urbanization,
environment, oceanography, and agriculture. [53 p. 219]
The new agreement makes the two nations appear more
equal. The bases no longer are American or even joint Spanish-
American; they are Spanish. The United States is granted
simply the use of certain facilities. In the past, the United
States was responsible for the defense of the bases; now
Spain is. However, each nation retains the inherent right of
self defense. In addition, Spain will be able to exercise
greater control over the activities of the American forces
stationed in Spain. This will be accomplished through the
Joint Defense Committee and the Joint Control Center. In a
sense, through these organizational bodies, Spain will be in-
directly linked to NATO and the defense of Europe. This was
very satisfactory to most Spanish military, since they gener-
ally desire integration into western defense. [25 p. 31]
In return for American use of Spanish military facili-
ties, the United States agreed to assist Spain to strengthen
its defense system by the extending of $125 million in credit
to buy military equipment plus an outright grant of $20 million.
The key item purchased by Spain with the credit was 36 F-4
Phantom aircraft. These planes were of an early type and were
no longer being manufactured. Even though in a used condition,
they would greatly improve the Spanish air force . This purchase
was to be augmented by another purchase of 30 Mirage jets from
France under a separate agreement. [27 July 31, 1970, 2:4]
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Two very important features of the agreement should
also be noted. First, the use by the Government of the
United States of Spanish facilities would be free of all
taxes, charges and encumbrances; all permanent structures
belong to Spain. Second, the United States would support
Spanish defense efforts by contributing to their defense
industry modernization and provide military assistance, but
these would be subject to approval of appropriations by
Congress and United States legislation. [60 p. 240]
The most important part of the agreement was of
course the extent of actual United States military commitment
guaranteed to the defense of Spain. As in pre-signing
discussions, the vagueness of the wording allows for various
interpretations
.
The State Department noted in its official statement
of United States policy toward Spain in 1970 that the new
base agreement was a symbol of American goodwill and
cooperation with Spain, but, "the agreement does not embody
any mutual defense commitment." [57 p. 19] This was how the
United States interpreted the following quote from Chapter
VIII of the agreement:
Consequently, both Governments, within the framework
of their constitutional processes, and to the extent
feasible and appropriate, will make compatible their
respective defense policies in the areas of mutual
interest, and will grant each other reciprocal defense
support.
Each government will support the defense system of the
other and make such contributions as are deemed
necessary and appropriate to achieve the greatest
possible effectiveness of these systems to meet
possible contingencies. [60 p. 240]
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Mr. John H. Morse, Deputy Assistant Secretary of
Defense, later stated at hearings before the House of Repre-
sentatives, Subcommittee on Europe on July 21, 1971 that,
"On our part, these 'terms and conditions' provide only that
the United States will make available certain items of mili-
tary equipment and training, and help in modernizing Spanish
defense industries, subject to the appropriation of necessary
funds by the Congress." [53 p. 2 61]
So as far as the United States was concerned, the use
of the bases was maintained; the cost was surplus military
equipment, some aid, and non-military cooperation, but no
commitment. The following very wise observation is probably
the most candid remark made about the actual policy of the
United States. "During the course of the negotiations, General
Wheeler informed the Spanish: 'By the presense of the United
States forces in Spain the United States gives Spain a far
more visible and credibly guarantee than any written document'."
[42 p. 177-178]
Attention must also be given to the Spanish opinion
of the agreement as well as how we thought they felt. The
agreement was completed and would not be changed for five
years, but the Spanish degree of satisfaction with the 1970
agreement will bear heavily on the 1975 negotiations.
Foreign Minister Lopez Bravo presented the new agree-
ment to the Foreign Relations Commission of the Cortes in much
the same manner that the Secretary of State presented it to
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the Senate. The Spanish government was trying to convince
the Cortes and the country that the new agreement was good
for Spain. Sr. Bravo stressed the point that in a time of
transition, Spain needs the support of a great power. [27
July 31, 19 70, 2:4] The term transition most likely refers
to the economic growth, but it could mean political opposition
or liberalization or even the decline of Franco.
The Spanish press, however, felt that Sr. Bravo had
not given all the facts and also that the American aid was
meager. There was also displeasure with the vagueness of the
agreement, even though the government was satisfied that they
had a greater commitment, the agreement did not seem anymore
definitive than the 1963 agreement. In reference to this
complaint that the American aid was meager, Edward King, a
retired United States Army colonel, stated before the House
of Representative Subcommittee on Europe that "Many of the
upper and middle grade officers are convinced that the United
States took advantage of an unsettled Spanish internal poli-
tical situation to slip by what they consider was a steal of
the base renewal." [53 p. 24 3] All the equipment was old
or used and some of it was about to be put into storage. To
attempt to maintain old equipment that is out of production is
difficult for the United States: for another nation to even
hope to keep it operational is almost impossible. For example,
a World War II submarine, such as Spain was given, requires
constant repair and careful maintenance to keep it operational.
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If only a few minor repairs must be delayed because of lack
of spare parts, the submarine is unsafe and therefore non-
operational and non-functional except as a display item.
The Spanish opposition presented its dissatisfaction
with the base agreement by making their own prediction.
"Professor Enrique Tierno Galvan, one of the opposition
leaders, said, 'When democratic forces govern Spain, we shall
not feel obliged to respect this pact. 1 " [49 August 8, 1970,
3:d] They were also confident that a struggle to block the
agreement would continue in Spain and the United States as
the people become more aware of their rights and powers.
American governmental officials often like to comment
on how they think the Spanish people feel about the agreement.
One such official, Mr. Arva Floyd from the European Bureau
of the Department of State, stated on July 19, 1971, "It is
an agreement which the Spanish Government and Spanish people
support and I do not foresee any problems for the next 5-year
period." He went on to say, "As in any free press, there
have been articles in Spanish press asking why do we need
bases? What do we get out of it? But generally it is accept-
able." [53 p. 226] These are sweeping generalities put forth
to convince the American people that the United States did
the best she could and Spain is happy. Mr. Floyd neglected
to note a few specific facts.
On March 18, 19 66 the rules for governing the Spanish
press were laid down. The free press that Mr. Floyd referred
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to exists in name only. The new regulations abolished censor-
ship, but administrative powers of confiscation were main-
tained. The authorities must receive copies of all papers
one hour before they are sent out for distribution. Offenses
under the previous censorship law were subject to administra-
tive penalties, but now they may be punishable by fines and
prison sentences. This regulation was expanded to include
all journalists and editors on March 31, 1966. In other words,
the new law on the press had not changed the political content
on the papers; they still reflected generally what the
government desired. [13 p. 334]
If Mr. Floyd based his evaluation of the support of
the people on the content of the Spanish "free press", he
made a serious error. To assume that no opinion is equiva-
lent to passive support is also a mistake. Neither the Spanish
nor the American people were consulted or even made aware of
the text of the negotiation or the form of the agreement. It
is also not possible to conclude that popular support is pre-
sent merely because non-military aid was included in the agree-
ment. The population as a group of individuals does not hope
to realize any gain from this aid. For these reasons, most
of the Spanish people are generally indifferent about the
agreement.
In conclusion, Spain stubbornly worked for two years
to get a defense commitment or alternatively a large amount
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of American aid. Along the way the United States refused to
negotiate for a defense treaty, went to the executive agree-
ment format, showed some disregard for Spanish pride, refused
to give any support to Spain concerning Gibraltar, and succeeded
in getting vague wording, and an agreement on a small amount
of aid. Does the United States negotiate so superbly or is
it just lucky?
The process of negotiation goes back to the old prin-
ciple of, "I have something you need, what is it worth to
you?" Both sides realized that the United States still held
the upper hand; Spain was still dependent on America for aid
and to a greater degree commercial trade. There was also an
indirect dependence on the United States for defense both
support and mere presence. No other nation could provide the
military aid that Spain desired with the exception of the
Soviet Union which Spain would not even consider. Spaid held
out as long as possible and tried to assert its independence
and concern for equality.
The United States, in one sense, used luck to force
a settlement. The Senatorial disagreement with the administra-
tion was a sign to both sides and especially Spain that they
better sign now. It was better for Spain to sign now rather
than being forced to wait and possibly be offered less for




Since 1970, Spain has continued a slow concerted move
to integrate into the European community. If the scale of
dependence shifts in favor of Europe instead of the United
States, so also will the upper hand in negotiations shift.
A change in the form of the Spanish government may hasten
this process.
The 1970 agreement expires September 1975. A declara-
tion of principles was begun by Secretary of State Henry
Kissinger and signed on July 9, 1974 by President Nixon,
thereby, officially beginning negotiations for a renewal of
the agreement. Our needs are the same as before, but now
Spain may be able to more equally bargain and in fact possibly
even hold the upper hand.
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IV. SPANISH FOREIGN POLICY
Spanish foreign policy can be described best as a slow
continual movement away from isolation. Spanish heritage
compels the nation to seek its rightful place as an influential
member in European as well as world affairs. The same Spain
that helped discover the New World is desperately trying to
reassert its place in the Old.
The Spanish Civil War almost completely destroyed the
economic as well as the political structure of Spain. The
nation was left without monetary wealth or allies willing to
rebuild Spain. The isolation imposed on Spain by many of
the European nations following World War II was another event
which furthered the unfortunate suppression of Spanish
advancement since the beginning of the end of the Spanish
Empire in 1492.
This date that is remembered as the year Columbus
discovered America was a very important year in the future of
Spain. Two decisions made at this time would begin a chain
of events that would cause the expanding empire to decline
and have effects on future Spanish advancements. The first
decision was the elimination of all Jews from Spain. By
doing so a large segment of the merchant class in Spain was
lost just at a time when the expanding empire was in need of
trading expertise. The second event was the forcing out of
Spain of the last of the Moorish Kings from Granada thereby
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removing a large elite segment from Spanish society. [21 p. 24
The result of these two actions was the inability of Spain to
support its growing areas of influence. This stagnation of
Spanish development would continue to be felt even today as
technology and modernization occur in neighboring European
nations while Spain is continually trying to catch up.
In the last ten years Spain has acquired significant
economic advances but only by relying on American and
European bases of trading and scientific knowledge. What has
happened during this period has and will continue to affect
Spanish Foreign policy. Prosperity has caused the people of
Spain to more closely evaluate foreign influence instead of
blindly accepting aid and investments without consideration
of consequences. For example, it is no longer valid to assume
that Spain will remain dependent on the United States and that
American military presence will be desired. The times have
changed since the 1953 opening of the isolation barriers to
Spain; governments in Europe and the United States have
changed hands frequently; limited conflicts have demanded
foreign policy positions. Only one thing remains constant
and is still the controlling force in Spain: Franco.
The poles of Spanish foreign policy are illustrated by
Figure 2 and discussed in the following sections.
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A. SPAIN - A EUROPEAN NATION
The most important long range foreign policy concern of
Spain is its relationship to the individual nations of Europe
and to the European community as a single body. Geographically
Spain is obviously a member of Europe and indeed a link between
Europe and Africa; but politically Spain still is an outcast
from the community. General Franco's tight control policies
have prevented Spain from assuming its proper role in develop-
ment with the surrounding group of nations.
Spain was forced to wait until the decade of the 60 's
to begin to receive any recognition by the European nations.
While Spain lay economically dormant from the end of World
War II until 1960 , the nations of Europe had rebuilt, expanded,
prospered, and begun to integrate. Their economies began to
grow outside their boundaries and were seeking new undeveloped
areas. Europe began to realize that Spain had resources which
were well worth developing. The dilemma of old memories versus
new riches was being faced by all European nations. The most
important fact was that even though the European nations had
changed leaders and forms of government since 1940, Spain was
still ruled by the same dictator. "As the regime of General
Franco lengthened and became embodied in every aspect of Spanish
society, ostracism has taken on a personal identification with
Franco himself." [52 p. 15] He has been, and is, the personi-




5pain is no longer dormant economically. General Franco
slowly changed his policies and has given Spain a new
for a prosperous future as well as respectability among
lations of the World. Spain appears to be slowly moving
rd integration into the European community. Under the
ance of modern minded technocrats, Spain has placed the
test emphasis on economic unity with Europe. There have
changes in the domestic political scene which indicate
» trend toward modernization in keeping with European
Sards. Since the area separating economics and politics
ften vague, the relation between the two processes will
tressed in the following discussion rather than the dif-
nces. This interaction will also be analyzed in respect
he application to internal Spanish military matters and
overall security of Europe.
From 19 33 until 1966 General Franco ruled Spain with abso-
authority which he seemed to believe would continue for-
. He made no provisions for a successor. On November
1966 the Cortes (the Parliament of Spain) gave its ex-
ed unanimous approval to the Organic Laws. General Franco
suddenly become concerned with an orderly turnover of his
r which he naturally wanted to go to someone of his choice
he Organic Law he consolidated older laws and clarified
'administrative procedures. The most important section of
ilaw provided for the eventual division of his solitary
Ition into two equal offices, the Head of State and the
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important if Spain is to become a democracy similar to
European nations and thereby recognized as an equal. [15 p. 8]
On June 8, 1973 Admiral Blanco was appointed as the Prime
Minister of Spain, thereby, acquiring in theory one-half of
Franco's power. In actuality, Franco was still Head of State
and still in absolute control. He allowed Admiral Blanco to
select his own cabinet of ministers, and to institute minor
policies of his own as well as continue supervising the
everyday functions of government.
Just as political liberalization was beginning to make
progress, Admiral Blanco was assasinated on December 20, 1973.
Spain's first attempt to orderly transfer leadership had been
spoiled. This led to a set-back in the schedule of moderniza-
tion of political processes. The government resorted to its
proven method of control; expeditious and strict military
procedures were instigated to assure order.
According to his own law, General Franco had ten days to
select a new Prime Minister from a list of three names pre-
sented to him by the Council of the Realm. From December 20
until 29 the Vice Prime Minister, Senor Fernandez Miranda, was
the acting Prime Minister. On the 29th of December Senor
Carlos Arias Navarro was appointed to the position of Prime
Minister. As his predecessor, he also was a faithful follower
of Franco and a long time friend.
Senor Navarro's first official task was the naming of his
new cabinet. In doing so he carefully removed all previous
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ministers who were members of the Catholic layman organiza-
tion known as Opus Dei (the members are often referred to as
technocrats) . General Franco has recently attacked the Opus
Dei as an organization that is sowing discord in Spanish
institutions which are in good health. He and the armed
forces distrust the Catholic organization and are very watch-
ful of its activities. [25 p. 11] The purge by Navarro in-
cluded the replacement of Senor Rodo by Senor Cortina as the
Minister of Foreign Affairs. The significance of this move
is that Franco and possibly the new Prime Minister fear the
power and influence that this lay organization has obtained
through the influence of its cabinet members. General Franco
had restrained the right-wing elements and had allowed the
technocrats to progress in modernizing the Spanish economy,
to open Spain to foreign investment, and to seek a closer
relationship with the European community. Franco now seems
to fear the power that they have acquired. [25 p. 5]
The primary founders of the economic miracle, Senor Bravo
and Senor Rodo, have both been removed from their Ministry
positions because of their political power. This is difficult
to explain since Spain has only one legal political party, the
National Movement. The Opus Dei is political, but it is also
legal because it is an organization of the official church of
Spain. For Spain to display any political modernization, the
government must recognize the other parties that exist within




On February 12, 1974, Prime Minister Navarro announced
a new liberalization policy that would be instituted if law
and order could be maintained. The mayors of cities and the
presidents of provincial councils are to be elected rather
than appointed by the Minister of Interior. The government
is also considering making the Cortes, the sindicatos or
government-run trade unions, and the only political party
more representative. Navarro also indicated that the Span-
iards of today should be able to form political groups, so as
to permit meaningful elections of officials. [38 p. 41]
This was only an announcement of possibilities, not a guarantee
of institution; but it is verbal hope for the people in a
time of political anxiety. It is a strong indication that
Franco is trying to realistically prepare his nation for his
rapidly approaching death which could create a political
vacuum. The new liberal policies have the appearance of
coming directly from the Prime Minister, thereby, shifting
public attention and support to that office; he is their way
to a new future, if he has the support of the Spanish army
and the people. The office of Head of State (or as it is
often called the King of Spain) after the death of Franco will
probably be more symbolic than functional especially considering
the non-committal character of Juan Carlos.
Political structural similarities with European nations
are only beginning to appear. The conclusion should not be
reached that there is neither hope for integration nor that
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Spain does not desire it. In particular, the reader must
remember that internal Spanish political modernization is
often hidden by world news reporting of instances of repres-
sive tactics directed against minority groups, regional ethnic
conflicts, and student and worker problems. World opinion
is generally one-sided since the good news of successful
programs is rarely reported. News censorship is also still
practiced in Spain.
In May of 1972 the illegal Spanish Socialist Party which
has open offices in France and an underground segment in
Spain issued the following statement: "Both parties (French
and Spanish branches) "... consider that the juridical -
political isolation with relation to a united Europe ... in
which our country finds itself harmful for the present and
future of Spain. 1 The ' ... unavoidable demands of an his-
torical, cultural, social, political and economic nature ...'
make Spain's eventual participation in the Community a neces-
sity." [49 May 18, 1972, 8: a] This statement summarizes
the general feelings of Spain toward integration: it is a
necessity for the future.
However, the consensus of opinion in Europe agrees that
as long as Franco is alive there is no hope for Spanish entry
into European politics, the European Community (formally the
European Economic Community or EEC) , or the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO) . This exclusion does not include
all areas of trade and investments, nor does it include the
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prosperous tourist industry, by which Spain has made great
economic progress thereby starting the integration process.
[52 p. 15]
The present status of relations with the key European
nations of Great Britain, France, and West Germany is impor-
tant in considering how well Spain has overcome its isolation.
Each nation has strong economic ties with Spain, but particular
political problems still plague the relationships.
The relations between Great Britain and Spain continue
to be strained over the question of Gibraltar. In 1972
negotiations between the two nations resumed after a five
year deadlock. Sir Alec Douglas Home and Senor Lopez Bravo
conducted extensive discussions in London and Madrid: no
agreement was reached. Spain wants Gibraltar under Spanish
control and Britain wants to protect the right of the English
people of Gibraltar who want to govern themselves. Spain
has sealed it off from the continent until an arrangement can
be reached. Negotiations resumed on July 19, 1972 in London
in a serious attempt to ease tensions. However, the Spanish
refused to lift the blockade and the British required an agree-
ment to reopen the frontier as an essential prerequisite for
effective progress toward the resolution of the problem. A
standstill has resulted concerning the future of Gibraltar.
Spanish relations with France are generally very good.
The nationalistic independent foreign policies of the two
nations are similar. They cooperate because it is mutually
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beneficial to do so. As one example, "In June, 19 70 the
Spaniards signed an agreement for military cooperation with
the French, and since then there have been joint manoeuveres
as well as important defense contracts; Spain is for example,
manufacturing Mirage fighters under licence from France."
[25 p. 13] As another example, on January 29, 1973, France
and Spain signed two agreements on the delimitation of their
continental shelf and territorial waters in the Bay of Biscay.
The bay was divided in half with a special zone near the center
in which the two countries would cooperate in the exploitation
of hydrocarbon reserves. Similar negotiations are taking
place concerning the continental shelf in the Mediterranean.
[46 p. 26377]
Limited political conflict does exist between France and
Spain concerning the tolerant attitude of the French government
toward exiled anti-Franco organizations in France. There
has been recent agitation between the two countries concerning
the reluctance of France to restrict the activities of the
Spanish regional political group known as the Basques (ETA)
which is located near the Spanish-French border on the Atlan-
tic coast. This outlawed organization was responsible for
the assasination of the former Prime Minister, Admiral Blanco.
This event caused the Spanish government to make strong accu-
sations that the French authorities were tolerating the use
of Southern France as a base for terrorist activities
directed against Spain. [49 December 28, 1973, ltd]
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Spanish relations with West Germany are entirely economic
and will be discussed in relation to the European Community.
The area of economic integration is intimately related
with any future integration of Spain. It is the first step
toward true international recognition, and is very relevant
to future political and military unity with Europe.
In 1972 a special study group from the Foreign Affairs
Committee of the House of Representatives summarized its
findings on European integration as being progressive on
mainly the economic issues and specifically on trade matters
relating to common agricultural policies. These trade agree-
ments constitute the materials of which the political future
of Europe will be made, [52 p. 2] The study group witnessed
an application of the functionalist theory of integration as
put forth by Ernst Haas. He emphasized economic cooperation
and interaction as a preliminary step toward political inte-
gration through politization . Learned political behavior is
acquired by a spillover process from the learned cooperative
habits in the areas of interaction, such as trade agreements.
The nations begin to behave more as a union as common needs
draw them together or an external threat forces them to seek
refuge in unity. Common political institutions and functions
follow as an expected result.
Spain is far from political unity with Europe, but the
economic miracle that has occurred in Spain since 1960 may
complement the integrative progress already made by the
76

European nations. During this period, Spain achieved one of
the highest growth rates in Europe; for once there was a
positive balance of trade. This was caused by a combination
of three factors: the boom in the tourist trade, foreign
investment, and wages of migratory workers in other countries
[25 p. 23] "The economic stabilization program of 1959 and
the devaluation of the peseta together with its realignment
on a simple, fixed exchange basis, engineered by the Opus
Dei technocrats in the cabinet with the help of foreign
experts, laid the groundwork for the prodigious developmental
growth ever since." [12 p. 1]
The economic integration of Spain into the European
community would progress rapidly if Spain were able to gain
full membership in the Common Market. International politics
prevent this from happening. According to the Treaty of Rome
which established the EEC in 1958, the approval of admission
is based on a unanimous decision of the member nations. The
Treaty also required that the member nations be peaceful and
democratic. Here lies the center of Spain's integration
problem.
France is generally in favor of Spain becoming a member
of the European Community mainly because of the geographic
reasons. West Germany is not adverse to Spain's admission
but the political party in power is the key factor in the
German position. The Christian Democrats (CDU/CSU) are much
more receptive to such a proposal. Italy has not openly
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advocated Spanish membership in the Community, but the opinion
is that Italy is not adverse to the idea with the exception
of a very vocal left faction and the businessmen concerned
about the competition Spanish products especially fruits and
olive oil may create. Belgium believes that Spain should be
a member, but that a change in the internal political struc-
ture in Spain is a prerequisite. The Netherlands is against
any idea of a member nation with a dictatorship form of govern-
ment. In response to a statement by the former French Presi-
dent Pompidou in which he said that he favored immediate
admission of Spain, the Prime Minister of Denmark made the
following statement: "We would use our veto, just as we
did when Spain was proposed for membership in NATO. If Den-
mark is going to be a member of the Community it will not be
possible to obtain the required unanimous approval of member-
ship: but I am sure that Denmark would not be alone in taking
this stand." [49 September 23, 1972, 4:b]
In summary the small nations of Denmark, Belgium, and the
Netherlands will not approve membership of Spain until it is
Democratic. A press release by the European Parliament through
the European Information Service dated March 16, 19 74 reaffirm-
ed the above 1972 position on Spain's entry into the EEC.
"These continual violations perpetrated by the Spanish govern-
ment against human rights and the rights of the citizen and
its intolerance of the rights of minorities hinder the entry
of Spain into the Common Market."
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In spite of the rejection of Spanish membership in the
Common Market, Spain has reached a Preferential Trade Agree-
ment with the Community. Under the careful supervision of
the Foreign Minister, Senor Lopez Bravo, the agreement was
signed on June 29, 1970. The agreement called for mutual
tariff reductions and import liberalizations. It was meant
to be the first stage of a two stage agreement. [43 p. 16]
Senor Bravo described the agreement as "... the first,
irreversible step in Spain's progressive integration into
the European continent." [May 11, 1972, 19 :a] With the
recent enlargement of the Common Market in January of 1973,
new temporary protocals were signed to maintain the present
agreement for one year during which time negotiations would
take place to renew the old agreement. The new one would
come into force on January 1, 1974, unless difficulties arise
because of Britain's doubts about membership; also a loss of
the lucrative British market would be a severe blow to the
Spanish economy. [46 p. 25713]
The EEC's public show of disunity in the early months of
1974 has been watched very carefully by Spain. The right wing
would be enthusiastic about a split of the Nine which could
lead to a revival of the European Free Trade Association
(EFTA) . The EEC supporters in Spanish government see the




Spain is more eager than ever to get into the EEC since
it appears Britain will remain a member. Also Spain is
concerned because of the 1.5 million Spaniards who worked
in EEC countries, and contributed $700 million to the balance
of payments in 1972. A return of these emigrants would mean
a blow to the balance of payments and also a severe unemploy-
ment problem in Spain. These workers have been in areas with
free trade unions and would probably resist changing back to
restrictive labor conditions that exist in Spain; internal
unrest could easily result if the return occurred. Since
some EEC nations have indicated that priority in job availa-
bilities will be given to EEC workers, membership in the EEC
for Spain is beginning to appear as a necessity not only for
international economics but also for internal political
stability.
Through trade agreements, Spain finally realized some
degree of formal recognition. The nations of Europe are
extremely interested in Spain as an area to expand their
economies. Through capital investment, the major nations of
Europe have financed industries in Spain, thereby giving
them a large and growing stake in Spanish prosperity. The
rapid integration of Spain into Europe economically remains
governed by political restrictions. This economic coopera-
tion appears to have a strong influence on the new internal
political liberalization policies in Spain, as well as bring
the nations of Europe closer together. Spain is now making
80

a serious effort to conform to the standards of her
European neighbors so as to increase all forms of integration
The most obvious advantage of any form of European
integration is the economic growth that Spain would continue
to enjoy. Exclusion from the European market may not only
greatly affect Spanish agriculture exports, but it may
destroy the market for the growing production of manufactured
goods. Since the peseta was devalued in 1967, and partially
floated in 19 74, these goods are in great demand in the
European Community. The business interests of all the
European nations are very much in favor of economic integra-
tion. Political integration may some day begin to appear,
but it will be only a by product of the economic cooperation.
[11 p. 34]
Spain has been transformed into a modern consumer society,
The per capita national income has surpassed the magic $1000
figure. The strength of this economy has enabled Spain to
create and retain foreign confidence. The nation has worked
a modern miracle of economic success but is still burdened
with an antiquated political system.
In summary, the economic problem now facing Spain is that
over one-half of Spanish exports go to either Common Market
nations or European Free Trade Association nations. Spain
depends on trade with countries which belong to private clubs
which it is not allowed to join. Spanish trade is also
threatened in the North American community. Fifteen per cent
of Spain's total exports go to an American market that is
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liable to change at anytime depending on the party in office
and the strength of the lobbies demanding protection from
foreign products. [11 p. 34]
Spain sponsors very little internal research and develop-
ment. Technology is purchased abroad, mainly from the United
States, West Germany, and Italy. There is also minor depen-
dence on other nations for this commodity which may carry with
it some degree of implicit control over industrial progress
in Spain. An integrated community would foster a greater
and freer flow of technological advancements. [12 p. 2]
The above advantages of economic integration may be
partially realized without any further political cooperation,
but it would probably never equal the advancements already
made by the Common Market. Democracy in keeping with the
definitions of Denmark, Belgium and the Netherlands is the
key to further integration in any area. When they are satis-
fied that the people of Spain are truly represented in govern-
ment, then their opinion may change. However, as long as the
symbol of their historic adverse feelings, General Franco,
is in control of Spain, true recognition will be withheld.
History has spoken even time and money will not completely
erase the memories.
Therefore, the most important event which will influence
the integration of Spain into Europe will be the death of
Franco. Even though at the age of 81 he still appears to be
in complete control of the nation, the army is actually
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providing the stability which is preserving order as politi-
cal anxiety builds; the army will preserve the nation through
the turmoil of his death. In spite of the fact that Franco
has made preliminary steps for orderly passage of power,
political conflict will naturally result in his absence. The
Opus Dei technocrats will most likely assume control since
they are the most organized and experienced. They will be
able to guarantee continued economic growth as well as enlist
the confidence of the Army. These two requirements are neces-
sary for future Spanish politicians and political organization
The other exiled and underground parties and trade unions will
provide the government with feedback from the people as well
as requirements for their welfare.
Therefore, if the technocrats obtain control easily and
quickly in cooperation with the present liberal Navarro re-
gime, economic and possibly political and military integra-
tion will advance rapidly. The present trend toward adapting
internal political structure in an effort to correspond with
European national and Community structure is an indication of
Spanish intent and sincerity. Since the integration of the
military is much more related to cultural pride, it will not
proceed quite as rapidly unless a real military threat exists
in Europe
.
The vacuum of Franco's death may, on the other hand, throw
Spain backward. Political chaos may keep Spain so involved
with internal problems for an extended period and thereby
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prohibit even the thought of any political activity on any
international level. Europe will recognize Spain only when
they are confident that Spain is politically stable, and
most certainly not until Franco is dead.
The solution of the Gibraltar problem is also a prereq-
uisite for political integration. Even though Great Britain
has invested great amounts of capital in Spain and is a major
contributor of tourists, political cooperation remains an
unapproachable subject. Again, it appears that Franco's death
will be the beginning point of negotiations. The prosperity
of the Spanish area around Gibraltar due to the tourist trade
may change the direction of envious gazers at the border gate.
The people of Gibraltar may possibly even seek Spanish control
after Franco dies since their small area is no longer the
center of prosperity that it once was. The institution of
democracy may also influence the decision of the people of
Gibraltar.
The growing economy of Spain is giving it a stronger voice
in world business. It may even serve as a wedge to force
political concessions and recognition, but it is best used as
a coercive device to foster faith and trust of the world
nations. Between now and Franco's death, the nation must
prepare itself for democracy if it is to be accepted polit-
ically by the European nations; any other course of action
will certainly decelerate, if not stop, any form of integra-
tion. The nations of Europe are anxious to see the new Spain,
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but they will be very critical of its form. Spain will have
one chance to catch the train to European unity and prosperity,
but she must buy the ticket now and with her own resources.
It is also high time that the West accepts Spain for what it
is; a corner of Europe with a part to play in the security
and prosperity of the whole.
B. BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP WITH THE UNITED STATES
The first ten years of the 1953 Base Rights and aid agree-
ment were of great value to Spain which was in severe economic
trouble and in post-war isolation. Since 19 63, United States
aid has decreased. For the most part, this aid has been in
the form of military assistance and cash to purchase used
military equipment. (See Table 1)
The Spanish government continues to provide the same excel-
lent bases, but they do not feel that Spain is receiving equi-
table payment, especially when compared to the benefits and
aid that NATO countries receive. [25 p. 12] The report of a
special congressional study mission to Europe in 19 72 stated
that "The expectation of substantial American military aid
has never been fulfilled to Spanish satisfaction." [52 p. 16]
In addition Spain has never received a mutual security pact
such as enjoyed by all NATO nations. The present 1970 agree-
ment, as discussed earlier, links Spain and the United States
together, but because of the intentional vagueness concerning
defense relations and its specific rent requirements for United
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greatest link between the nations in the form of trade,
investment, and tourism is largely independent of the agreement
Spain has derived some sense of equality with European
nations militarily through the bilateral agreement. The Joint
Committee established in Article 36 of Chapter VIII of the 1970
agreement is composed of the Foreign Minister of Spain and
the United States Ambassador to Spain as Co-Chairmen, with
the Chief of the Spanish High General Staff and the Commander-
in-Chief, United States European Command (CINCEUR) as military
advisers. Since CINCEUR also has a NATO position, there is
a linkage between Spain and NATO. This association appears
to be as close as Spain will get to a multilateral security
organization, at least as long as Franco is alive.
However, Spain has shown support of the Soviet-promoted
European Security Conference which stresses Europe as a unit
including all nations within the geographic area. This support
appears to be mainly a threat to force the United States as
well as NATO into realizing that Spain should have an active
voice in the defense of Europe. The vague, passive, bilateral
relationship with the United States does not provide the
equality, and respectability that Spain desires.
In the past the United States provided significant economic
aid as well as military equipment. This situation no longer
exists. Trade with Europe and the resulting Spanish prosperity
has made Spain less dependent economically on the United
States. The United States share of the Spanish import market
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has dropped from an average of 17.4 percent (67-70) to 15.4
percent in 19 72. In the same year 15.3 percent of Spain's
total export was directed toward the United States. At the
same time over 50% of Spain's total trade was conducted with
members of the EEC and EFTA (European Free Trade Association)
.
[8 p. 12]
American military aid and equipment is not essential since
many items such as artillery, submarines, jet fighters, and
all sizes of surface vessels can now be built in Spain. Most
of the equipment is under contract for other nations but the
technology is either present in Spain now or it may be purchased
from European nations.
The bilateral relationship with the United States remains
as a strong pole of Spanish foreign policy as long as the
present regime under Franco is in power. A governmental change
will most certainly bring a serious reevaluation of the only
remaining significant factor of the relationship between Spain
and the United States: base rights.
The American foreign policy toward Spain continually sup-
ports Spanish integration into Europe even though this posi-
tion will certainly erode some of the benefits that the United
States has enjoyed on a bilateral status. However, since the
United States and the European community are closely linked
together through multi-national organizations, the integration
of Spain should in fact add to the Spanish-American relation-
ship. The amount of remaining dependence on the United States
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may soon be measured as Spain makes public its foreign policy
toward the United States as negotiations begin for the renewal
of the 1970 agreement.
C. NATO AND THE SPANISH MILITARY
Officially the Spanish government views NATO as an insti-
tution of the past which has served its purpose and will soon
be replaced. " the EC represents, in aspiration, the
opportunity for Spain to recover its rightful place in Europe."
[52 p. 15] This seemingly blunt position against NATO would
not preclude a Spanish acceptance of an invitation for member-
ship. Spain would welcome a mutual defense agreement, but
the deep national pride forbids any subservient status. Spain
was isolated by the victorious Europeans following World War
II in 1945: now they must make the first gesture of good
faith.
Spain views its position in the defense of Europe as being
essential. She has consistently taken an anti-communism stand
and has successfully suppressed any significant internal in-
fluence. In contrast, Italy and France are weak because of
the infiltration of Communism into the political structure
of the nations. Spain also realizes that it is of great geo-
graphic value as the guardian of the entrance to the Mediter-
ranean and the European link with Africa.
The integration of the Spanish military into the defense
structure of Europe would bring increased aid, modernization
of equipment, and greater world respect. Membership in a
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European defense alliance would also be an advantage in terms
of the exchange of intelligence and defense technology. Most
of all, it would provide a nuclear umbrella. At present the
United States nuclear submarines at the base at Rota are ded-
icated to American national defense which also implies the
defense of NATO European nations. The Spanish pride has
been offended by twenty years of rejection. If Europe as a
unity does not accept Spain, then it seems very likely that
she will seek an alliance or relationship with a single nation
such as France.
A military integration of Spain into a European organiza-
tion such as NATO would place a burden on the Spanish budget.
This disadvantage would probably be overshadowed by the aid
Spain would receive from the other nations. General Franco
has been able to reduce defense spending mainly by efficiently
using the military aid that the United States has provided.
In 1970 the Spanish defense expenditure per capita was $19.
Turkey was the only European country with a lower figure
($14) . [8 p. 46] Franco has been able to maintain a strong
professional army that completely supports his regime, there-
by allowing him to remain in power. Through the loyalty of
the army, Franco maintains authoritarian control; through
the respect of the people, the army symbolizes national unity
and maintains order and stability.
Spain's armed forces number about 300,000, of which two-
thirds are eighteen month conscripts. The officer corps has
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come to resemble a separate caste which continues from genera-
tion to generation. They are seldom seen and they live apart
from the rest of society. They are forbidden from taking part
in politics, thereby, preserving their symbol of the impartial
national arbiter of politics and future solidarity. However,
recently low military pay, referenced to inflation, has forced
many professional military personnel to seek additional employ-
ment. This factor plus the recent shift of society from the
far right political position to little left of center has
caused a beginning of a new form of dissent in Spain that may
have a strong influence in the nation's future.
NATO is a major factor in Spanish integration into Europe.
Since the small-member nations oppose the admission of a dic-
tatorship such as Spain, the Franco government has not been
able to use this organization as a means of integration. The
United States has repeatedly petitioned for Spanish membership
with no success. The new liberalization policies now being
introduced in Spanish internal politics, may lead to future
membership in NATO as well as the EEC. Membership in itself
is not a goal but rather an additional step toward the integra-
tion. NATO affects Spanish integration mainly as an added
benefit of belonging to the European club. Spanish membership
is not a national goal since through bilateral relationship
with the United States, Spain participates in a passive way
in the defense of the West. Through the indirect relationship,





The recent change in the government of Portugal has
attracted a great deal of attention from all segments of the
Spanish population. Since the dictatorship form of government
present in Portugal prior to the coup was similar to Francoism,
parallels have been projected toward future events in Spain.
As Portugal tries to organize a government on a democratic
platform careful note is taken by the Spanish of the success
or failure of each step.
The events taking place in Portugal have an indirect ef-
fect on Spanish foreign policy. The reactions caused by these
events relative to Spanish internal politics are more impor-
tant to a thorough understanding of future Spanish policy
than their effect on the government of Portugal. Therefore,
the results rather than the causes are discussed below.
The Spanish government has taken precautions to keep the
political disorder of Portugal out of Spain. Border restric-
tions have been imposed and news coverage of Portuguese events
is carefully monitored. But now, there is also a new sense
of caution present; the far right might not be the safest
position should a similar event happen in Spain. Therefore,
as inflation, political uncertainty, business cutbacks, and
strikes grow in severity and frequency the threat to the Franco
government is not across the border but rather from internal
unrest. This has always been present to some extent but it
was always effectively countered by the internal military
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structure. This force still exists but now as the problems
grow in number and complexity brute force may not be the
proper method to be used to solve them.
A recent survey published by the Magazine Cambio revealed
that the Spaniards who are not content with their present
political system and desire a democratic regime outnumber
those who are satisfied by over two to one. In the middle
class the ratio is three to one and in the upper class it is
four to one. [65 p. 39] There appears to be an opportunistic
rush to the left especially by publishers, lawyers, bankers,
civil servants, trade union officials, and teachers. Even
the army has had some movement of this type but mainly in the
junior ranks, Association with the left and its democratic
socialism seems to be the way to establish a political alibi
just in case a change in the regime does occur and the result-
ing political vacuum is filled by the left. For 35 years
the Franco regime's propaganda has tried to discredit both
democracy and marxism. Since most of the resistance to the
government has been by communists, the effect of the propaganda
has been to glamorize the left.
Portugal, therefore has an indirect effect on Spanish
foreign policy through the internal political unrest in Spain.
It is still too early to evaluate how this will affect Euro-
pean integration. If some form of democratic government preci-
pitates, as appears will be the case, then all European nations
will be much more receptive to complete acceptance of Spain
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as an equal. Portugal's experience may be a catalyst which
will force Spanish government officials to accelerate liberal-
ization in order to avoid an internal crisis that would destroy
much of the progress witnessed since 1960. It also serves as
a test of Spain's ability to prove to other nations that it
is politically stable and able to adapt to changing conditions.
E. OIL AND THE ARAB WORLD
The Arab world is an important pole affecting Spanish
foreign policy. Just as Europe has its attractive force of
trade and tourism and the United States has its trade and
respectability, the Arab world has its valuable resource —
oil. During the past twenty years, Spain has been generally
sympathetic with Arab causes and has followed an independent
policy similar to France. Since being admitted to the United
Nations in 19 55, Spain has consistently backed Arab initia-
tives. In addition to the oil factor, Spain has historically
had interest in Africa because of colonial possessions some
of which were inhabited by Arabs.
A future energy crisis will not affect Spain very much.
Even though energy consumption is growing rapidly in Spain,
as cars and other consumer goods are distributed in the grow-
ing economy, the past relations with Arab and African nations
will insure a steady supply of oil. Today Spain is dependent
on foreign sources for 100 per cent of its natural gas, 96
per cent of its petroleum, and 9 8 per cent of its uranium for
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nuclear power. All of the natural gas comes from Libya.
Ninety per cent of the petroleum comes from the Middle East
and North Africa. Spain has been informed by the Arab oil
exporting consortium that she is a "friendly" nation and that
her oil needs will all be met. [12 p. 4]
This excellent relationship with Arab oil suppliers has
been threatened by the American pole of Spanish foreign rela-
tions. The past Mid-East crises involving Israel and Arab
nations has placed Spain in a politically dangerous position
concerning the use of American leased bases as support points
for Israel. The economic issue of oil has kept Spain very
cautious and slightly on the pro-Arab side. Spain has never
officially recognized Israel. The United States has been
limited in the use of the Spanish bases to mercy missions
only. In the 1967 Six-Day War, Spain allowed 3,400 Americans
evacuated from Libya and Algeria to await transfer at Spanish
bases. Officials have intimated that these bases probably
would not be available for direct support of any future Arab/
Israeli conflict or even any Soviet/American conflict that
could result. The consultation clause of the 19 70 agreement,
however, does leave this option open and undecided. For exam-
ple, during the September 1970, Jordanian crisis, ammunition
resupply flights to Jordan used Spanish bases. The resupply




Spain has basically four options available concerning the
United States base issue as referenced to a Middle East
conflict:
1. Support the Arabs
2. Complete neutrality
3. Allow free usage of Spanish bases
4. Participate in conflict militarily
Each option has an associated risk. Spanish active support
for the Arabs would seriously disrupt United States and Euro-
pean relations. A neutral position would be under great scru-
tiny by the Arab nations. Base availability and military
participation would obviously bring serious action by the
Arab nations. The fuel supply for Spain's growing economy
would most certainly be limited or possibly cut off. The
present Spanish position lying in between the first and second
options appears to be the safest and most logical for existing
conditions.
On a bilateral basis, Spain has signed cultural, educa-
tional and commercial agreements with Iraq, Egypt, Syria,
Jordan, Tunisia, Algeria, Mauritania, and Morocco. [8 p. 16]
These continuing displays of Spanish goodwill and interest
in Arab development are very important to Spain's goals of
international dignity and economic success. Spain must be
able to balance the political-economic forces of Europe, the




Spain weathered the 1973-74 energy crisis quite well;
none of the foreign policy poles were greatly affected.
Another crisis may force the European Community to seek
greater unity in order to strengthen their bargaining posi-
tion for petroleum products, but it would be unlikely to
strengthen Spanish integration since Spain does not need
Europe's group voice to secure oil. However, any change of
the Spanish foreign policy position concerning Middle East
affairs may force Spain toward closer European association.
Alliance with the European Communities and its integrated
position would probably take priority since more than just
oil is at stake. Europe represents western technology,
international respectability, trade, and possibly military
security.
F. COLONIAL POSSESSIONS
Spain presently has three colonies left in Africa. The
two Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla are located along
the Mediterranean coast of Morocco. The largest colony is
the Spanish Sahara located south of Morocco on the Atlantic
coast of Africa. (See Figure 3) The following statistics
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King Hassan of Morocco strongly desires to acquire the
Spanish Sahara and appears willing to use force. In
September, 19 74 he moved tanks, guns, and elements of Moroccan
army infantry to the border area. Reservists were called up,
blood banks were established, and a military headquarters was
set up at Agadir. These actions clearly indicate an intention
to go to war with Spain in order to control the Spanish
Sahara and its valuable phosphate resources.
Spain has 12,000 well trained and well equipped troops
in the territory to counter this serious Moroccan threat.
[63 p. 60] There are a total of 30,000 Spanish troops
stationed in African territories. [35 p. 33] Spain has been
under pressure from the Arab and African nations to relinquish
this colony, but there is very little agreement as to who
should receive custody or if it should be independent. Spain
would probably consider a peaceful arrangement, but a forceful
move by any of the neighboring nations will be strongly
opposed.
Morocco wants the territory because of the vast phosphate
deposits located there. Presently these are mined for
commercial fertilizer by Spain and foreign interests. Since
Morocco also relies on phosphate mining for export, the
Spanish Sahara is a competitive threat as long as Spain
controls the territory. If it belonged to Morocco a monopoly
situation would exist with associative price control.
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The other neighbors of the Spanish Sahara are Algeria
and Mauritania. Algeria desires that the nomad population
be given the chance to govern themselves. The Mauritanians
believe they have a valid claim to the area on the grounds
of similar racial stock with the inhabitants but they do not
appear to be willing to use force to acquire it.
Spain and Morocco also have a conflict of interest
concerning fishing rights. This occurred when Morocco
unilaterally proclaimed a 70 mile fishing limit. The new
ruling resulted in the impounding of numerous Spanish fishing
vessels and crews. Negotiations between the two nations
resulted in the signing of an agreement in Rabat on January 2,
1974 which will enable 200 Spanish fishing vessels to fish in
Moroccan waters within the framework of Spanish-Moroccan
cooperation in the joint Maroc-P^che Company. [46 p. 26342]
Since the Spanish fishing fleet numbers about 800 vessels
and 15,000 men, the government is very interested in their
economic welfare and is going to subsidize the conversion of
about 250 vessels to enable them to fish in more distant
waters. The most affected areas are the Spanish enclaves at
Centa and Melilla, and the cities of Malaga and Algeciras on
the Spanish coast.
In addition to the recent agreement and cooperation
concerning fishing rights, it is interesting to note that
Spain and Morocco do agree on security interests as presented
at the Helsinki conference on European Security and Co-operation
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Spain's colonies in Africa are economically and
politically important. They serve as a source of valuable
exportable products as well as a link with the African
continent and the Arab world.
Spain is willing to assist its colonies to attain
independence or to incorporate them into neighboring nations.
Through this cooperation policy and continued association
and assistance, Spain has reaped economic benefits. This
trend is expected to continue but any move to force Spain to
give up valuable territory will be forcefully resisted.
Spain and Algeria signed an agreement in March 19 74 which
involved the sale of 4,500 million cubic feet of Algerian
natural gas a year over the next 20 years. The relation
between these two nations remains good. Algeria is not in
favor of Spanish Sahara being incorporated by Morocco or
partitioned between Morocco and Manitania. [50 p. 2614]
In summary, Spanish colonies in Africa are important to
Spain and do occupy a significant portion of foreign policy
decision making. However, there appears to be very little
conflict of interest with Spanish integration processes.
There is some carry over to the association with the Arab
world nations and for this reason Spain tries to maintain a
friendly, negotiable appearance.
The Spanish colonies in Africa have drawn international
attention through the United Nations. The three neighboring
nations of the Spanish Sahara initiated decolonization action
that resulted in the repeated demands by the United Nations
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General Assembly that Spain hold a referendum in the territory
to pole popular support of self-determination. Spain
previously accepted the principle of the referendum but
consistently refused to specify a date. However, on August
21, 1974 the Spanish government announced that such a
referendum would be held in the first half of 1975 under the
auspices and guarantees of the United Nations. Spain has
also shown increased interest in helping the territory prepare
for self-determination by promoting internal autonomy.
Morocco interprets these recent events as a Spanish effort to
establish a puppet state. King Hassan, under various internal
pressures, has now strongly warned Franco not to take any
such unilateral action. Spain has gone back to the United
Nations with the claim that Morocco is interfering in a
United Nations supported Spanish effort in the African
territory. [50 p. 2614]
Spain seems to be building a case for reviving the
Gibraltar issue. Spain is dealing with its colonies in an
approved respectable manner; therefore, Great Britain should
also comply. In this light, the colonial question shows
deliberate Spanish diplomacy. If they must lose a colony,
they will do it in a peaceful, dignified manner thus assuring
a continued favorable African relationship as well as a
future lever to acquire territory with complete support of
the United Nations. Spain is banking on its example with
the hope that dividends will be payable in the future.
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V. PROSPECTS FOR FUTURE U.S. -SPANISH AGREEMENTS
The intent of this thesis is not to evaluate American
foreign policy in the European or Mediterranean areas.
Therefore, the following assumptions will be made for the
purpose of simplification of the evaluation of the effect
Spanish integration into Europe will have on the United
States as referenced to the issue of American military
presence:
1. The United States has a political commitment to
counter Soviet influence in Western Europe and to
influence political development in the Middle East.
2. An actual military presence in Europe and the
Mediterranean is necessary to insure that the
political commitment is fulfilled.
3. A naval fleet in the Mediterranean, ground forces
in Europe, and air supply and support are necessary
to provide a credible military presence.
4. American usage of Spanish military facilities is an
important element of the overall military presence.
For the purposes of this analysis, the assumption will
also be made that Spain is the changing element; United
States policy generally will be considered to be stable
concerning the base rights issue. As referenced to the
above basic United States foreign policy, the American
facilities in Spain are necessary for the overseas projection
of power and political influence. The word 'necessary' is
used instead of the word 'vital' which has associated final
and absolute connotations. 'Necessary' is more descriptive
in that there is some allowance for error and reevaluation.
Other factors of convenience, economics, and threat also
affect the true degree of necessity.
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A. PERCEIVED SPANISH NATIONAL GOALS
The first step in forecasting the future prospects for
U.S. -Spanish agreements is the analysis of the national goals
of Spain as they relate to past events and present foreign
policies. The methodology illustrated in Figure 4 will be
used in an effort to correlate important factors thereby
allowing significant and logical conclusions to be reached.
Each goal must be considered in relation to Spanish integration
into Europe. In doing so a net change in the shift of the
controlling pole affecting Spanish foreign policy will be
arrived at. The largest variable factor in Spain's future
is the type of government which will be installed. Since the
prediction of individual power figures after Franco is very
difficult and speculative, analysis of foreign policy will
be referenced to the three most probable political positions
of a post-Franco government.
The political spectrum of Spain in a simplified manner
would appear as follows:
FAR LEFT LEFT CENTER RIGHT FAR RIGHT
(present regime)




































This pole of the political spectrum has in the past been
forced to remain underground and in neighboring nations.
Only recently has their visibility increased as the government
has began to allow liberal opposition parties to voice their
positions. Political freedom and opposition to the conserva-
tive Franco regime are the major immediate goals of the left
wing. If power is acquired, internal stability would be a
necessity for continued control. The support of the workers
gives them power.
TECHNOCRATS
This is the middle position of the Spanish political
spectrum. Emphasis is always placed on economic and techno-
logical progress. The leaders are generally middle class
and are often members of Opus Dei. There is accommodation
with the right as well as desire for many of the liberal
policies of the left. Economic progress gives them power.
RIGHT WING
This pole is the conservative political position
indicative of the present regime. The army is the power
element behind the government. The present government is
moving cautiously toward the left but is unlikely to cross
the center. A few factions are moving toward the far right
in a defensive move to counter the growing liberal movement.
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As each perceived national goal is discussed relative to
the type of government described above a value is assigned
to it to indicate its position of importance. The sum total
of all goal values will be 1.0; the most important goal is
assigned the largest value based on subjective analysis of
past positions, statements, and actions. The following table
contains a relative value assignment for each goal that must
be considered by any future Spanish government.
TABLE 2
TYPE OF GOVERNMENT














The international economic crisis of 1973 faced Spain
with the choice between gaining stability by reducing economic
activity or maintaining the present growth rate. The Director
General of Commercial Policy of Spain, Sr. Hidalgo de Quintana,
has stated that Spain will move forward with economic development
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in order to take advantage of the economic potential and
industrial momentum already established. Both the problems
of internal inflation and the rising value of imports will
present future obstacles. Spain expects to have a cost of
living index exceeding 15 percent and a balance of payments
deficit of $1.5 billion by the end of 1974. [39 p. 7,8]
As illustrated by Table 3 the trade with Europe as
a group of nations has a great effect on Spanish international
commerce. However, there is a trade deficit each year which
must be balanced with other international monetary transfer
methods. Table 4 illustrates how important the tourist
industry and the Spanish foreign labor force are to the
balance of payments. In 19 72 these two factors accounted for
$2 84 4 million in trade balance. But now as the European
tourists, who can still afford vacations, come to Spain they
spend their inflated currencies. The unemployed Spanish
foreign labor force is also bringing the effects of European
inflation back to Spain in the form of labor unrest.
Cutbacks are being forced on Spanish industry because
of decreasing consumer purchasing power and increasing
production costs stemming primarily from higher energy prices.
Even though foreign investments are still actively solicited
by the present administration, world events continue to
restrict Spanish economic progress. As the Seat plants
layoff workers because of decreased production, unrest and
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1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972
1. 3200 3242 3865 4357 4577 6066
2. EXPORTS (fob) 1419 1667 1994 2483 2978 3812
3. TRADE BALANCE -1781 -1575 -1871 -1874 -1599 -2254
4. FOREIGN TRAVEL 1110 1111 1195 1543 1878 2245
5. OTHER SERVICES -236 -226 -225 -250 -191 -195
6. WORKERS REMITTANCES 320 319 400 467 548 599
7. OTHER PRIVATE TRANSFERS 126 129 150 192 224 278
8. OFFICIAL TRANSFERS 4 — -18 — -4 -9
TOEAL (4 to 8)
. CURRENT BALANCE
1325 1333 1477 1952 2455 2917
10 -456 -242 -394' 78 856 664
are feeling the strains of recession that are also very
evident in Europe and the United States. However, in Spain
this has resulted in a more volatile situation because of
the following additional factors;
1. There is national insecurity because of the possibility
of Franco's death at anytime.
2. There is a growing political party structure in a nation
that is politically ignorant. The Spanish people have
a real thirst for democracy, but they are confused by
the platforms of the well organized opposition parties
which are becoming more visible. Since the political
liberty which breeds good politicians has been absent
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in Spain for so long, the emerging parties must rely
on their underground strength.
3. There is a fear of the radical nature of the extreme
right and left. The liberalization policies feed the
fires of hope for the left and of conservative strength
for the right.
The present Spanish government as well as the post-
Franco regime must give priority to the goal of prosperity if
they are to maintain or acquire the continued support of the
people. In order to remain in power in modern Spain the
government must realize that the enticed appetites of the
Spanish consumer must be fulfilled. Fourteen years of
prosperity have given the people what the rest of Europe has
enjoyed for a longer period and to a greater extent. The
political body that can promise that GNP per capita will
continue to rise will have a political base to gain power.
This promise must be based on two very important assumptions.
The first is that the national goal of internal
stability is achieved and maintained in order that economic
prosperity may continue. A civil war or any lesser form of
conflict will only deplete Spanish reserves and divert vital
resources
.
The second assumption is that Europe will come to
Spain's aid. If Franco has passed from the scene then
expanded prosperity can be expected since nearly all barriers
to continued economic integration will have been lifted.
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Individual international disputes such as Gibraltar will
probably remain but trade generally will not be adversely
affected. The aid of the United States in the form of
increased trade would not be as important as the European
factor because there would be no incentive for United States
trade to increase. There is no trade barrier with the United
States as there is with Europe in the form of the dislike of
Franco and its resulting prohibition of Spanish EC admission.
Therefore, trade with the United States could be considered
to be at an optimum or even a maximum, but trade with Europe
has much greater potential for growth.
Economic integration into Europe is the best policy
for a Spanish administration that intends to ensure continued
economic prosperity. It is an important goal for any one of
the three Spanish political poles. Analysis of past trends
indicate that the technocrats have consistently emphasized
that economic growth is the most important ambition toward
which Spain should always move. Through their strong control
of banks, trade, and industry, the moderately liberal techno-
crats will continue to seek integration with Europe. At the
present time they must work within the boundaries of the
conservative regime. But as the economy of Spain slows down
due to the recession, the government again will have to rely
on the leadership of the technocrats to keep Spain moving,
just as was the case in the early 1960's. As liberalization




Both the left and the right wings rely on the
technocrats for guidance in making political platforms and
policies which will insure prosperity. Therefore, regardless
of the political pole of the future Spanish government, the
technocrats will direct economics toward the international
community which has the potential of enabling Spain to grow
and prosper. Attainment of this goal will greatly enhance
the national efforts to reach other goals. Integration into
Europe is, therefore, probably in the future for Spain.
American military presence in Spain can only affect
prosperity by providing a rent source. United States trade
with Spain would continue regardless of any base rights
agreement. Therefore, since all future Spanish governments
will have prosperity as a priority national goal, there is
less emphasis on maintaining or allowing the United States
to use Spanish facilities from an economic standpoint.
The left wing is assigned a value of . 3 for prosperity
because of its concern for the support of industry and the
consumer. If future economic progress can be guaranteed, then
the left will have gained a strong power base. Therefore,
prosperity is essential to the political strength of the left.
It is more important to their position than the right wing
because the left is not in control of the government and does
not have the successful history that is enjoyed by the right.
The support of the technocrats is essential for any platform
that insures future Spanish prosperity.
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The right wing is assigned a relative value of .2 for
prosperity because past success in this area has created the
secure feeling that the problem was solved in the 19 60 's;
future prosperity is acknowledged to be important in the
maintaining of popular support, but this can be achieved by
a continuation of previous policies with minor adjustments
for inflation and energy problems. The present regime made
this position public when the announcement was made concerning
economic policies for 19 75. The right wing is confident that
the technocrats will not allow a decline in prosperity, and
that Spain will continue to advance.
2 . Equality and Respect
The equality and respectability of Spain is the
greatest concern of the right wing. Past as well as present
policies indicate that international isolation angers and
frightens the right wing of the political spectrum. This is
very obvious because of the visibility of the foreign
policies of the Spanish government relative to the European
Community and the NATO nations, and the United States.
The political rejection by the European nations has
always been a thorn in the side of the Spanish government and
the associated right wing. International respectability and
membership in the important organizations has alwyas been a
national goal which is driven by Spanish pride and belief in
the value of Spain to the rest of the world. Spain seeks
prestige commensurate with its value as a modern leader of
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the nations of the world as well as its past history of
importance as an empire.
Since 1953, the United States has been the major
source of international equality. The bilateral agreements
have provided the Spanish government with a sense of value
relative to economic as well as political issues. For this
reason the right wing continues to be interested in strong
political association with the United States in order that
Spain can feel equal with the nations of Europe.
The post-Franco period would find the right wing
still seeking United States assistance and at the same time
struggling to gain immediate political acceptance from
European nations in order to legitimatize its continuing
claim to govern Spain. Through international status, the
other national goals will be achieved. The personage of
Franco is the barrier, which when removed will allow progress
on both economic and political integration policies with
Europe.
The left wing and the technocrats are not as interested
in international equality except as it relates to economic
wealth. Although there is little evidence to support any
value assignment for this goal as a platform of the left wing
or the technocrats, the assumption may be made that equality
will be sought through the channels of prosperity. As trade
increases with Europe, the political relations will strengthen,
especially after Franco. Since Europe as a community of
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nations is a significant power base, association with it
would be a logical move. Time would be required, but the
associative ground work has already been established for
equality and respectability.
This goal, though not equally important to all three
segments of the Spanish political spectrum, may be achieved
through the European community; the United States is no
longer the only catalyst or means by which international
equality and status may be acquired.
3. Internal Stability
Internal stability is the primary goal of the left
wing in a post-Franco period. At the present time political
organization and strength are the major concerns of this
segment of the political spectrum. A pov.'er base among the
workers must be established and be ready to make an effort
to acquire control of the government. If the left wing makes
significant power advances, its immediate national goal will
be stability. But until that time, instability will favor
and promote their policies.
The army will be the greatest factor in the prevention
of civil war and chaos. At the present time the Spanish
military completely supports the government and the right
wing political structure. Therefore, any left wing movements
to seize power will be severely repulsed. A gradual campaign
to influence the government and the people by the presentation
of liberal policies is the safest route for the left. The
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government and its institutions must remain intact so as to
allow the transformation to occur.
The right wing is assigned a .1 value because of its
superior power position and its probable similar status in
a post-Franco period. National stability was achieved after
the Civil V7ar; there is no fear of any weakening in this
absolute control. Stability, therefore, is not a national
goal that receives any significant amount of policy study.
The technocrats pursue a similar policy within the
framework of the present regime. The army has such great
power that there is no fear of any loss of stability. The
technocrats would in fact rely on the support of the army if
a national concern for economic progress allowed them to
assume control of the government.
4. Security Commitment
A security commitment is no longer necessary; there
is no military threat to the continental Spain, except for
the possibility of attack on United States facilities. A
commitment by an international power would mean that Spain is
important to that power and therefore worthy of respect.
The commitment would serve more as a by-product of an alliance
For this reason the right wing regime has given the national
goals of international equality and a security commitment
similar high priority. These are the central issues of the
Spanish position in the 1975 base rights negotiations. This
has been a consistent position since the early 1950's; there
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is a high probability that it will continue even after
Franco. However, the United States may not be the future
provider of security.
Even though previous agreements have never guaranteed
that the United States will defend Spain, there is an implied
commitment by the mere presence of United States forces.
Spain is important to the defense of the West as exemplified
by continued United States desire to keep defensive and
strategic military elements stationed there. Any attack on
Spain would probably be directed toward these facilities;
the United States would be forced to defend Spain to preserve
its own overseas defense structure. However, this position
has never been formalized.
Therefore, in reality a commitment by the United
States does exist, but the formality of acknowledgement of
the value of Spain and its bases is lacking. Spain has not
received the same equality and security that the NATO nations
enjoy, even though significant resources and risks are
involved and dedicated to the same goal.
After Franco, it is conceivable that political
integration into Europe may lead to a commitment by the NATO
alliance or even an independent nation such as France. As
long as equality is explicit in the agreement, Spain would
be very anxious to enter a mutual defense relationship. The
United States would then be forced to do the same or else
find its presence not desired. The risks involved would be
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the same as now, but the equality of the mutual defense
agreement would be far more satisfactory than a vague
executive agreement.
5. Support on Gibraltar and Sahara
International support on the Gibraltar and Spanish
Sahara issues is a minor national goal which is common to
nearly all political factions. These issues both invoke
Spanish nationalism and the support of the people. The
present government is concerned about the welfare of its
colonies and is prepared to defend Spanish claims.
The trend of past policies indicates no change;
Gibraltar should belong to Spain and the African colonies
will remain under Spanish control as long as possible. Since
neither the United States nor the European nations will support
or promote the Spanish position, the United Nations has been
the primary forum. Through careful diplomacy, Spain has
shown leadership and dignity in its efforts to influence the
member nations.
The right wing government would appreciate a favorable
United States position, but the consequences would make such
action unwise for the United States. Spain realizes this and
has never made this an issue during negotiations.
Future political relations with Europe and especially
Britain may lead to a solution of the Gibraltar situation.
Since Morocco is within the Arab world, Spain is better off
solving the African colony question by itself or through the
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United Nations; European nations would not risk publicly
supporting the Spanish position for fear of Arab reprisals.
B. U.S. POSITION IN FUTURE NEGOTIATIONS
The United States position in future negotiations is a
result of a balance between the State Department, the
Department of Defense, and the Congress. This chapter will
present some of the primary considerations of each of these
agencies in relation to the expected specific Spanish
positions
.
When the U.S. Department of Defense states that American
military presence in Spain is necessary, the Congress responds
with the question "How much will it cost?" and "How much will
we be committed?" The rental fee that Spain will request in
the form of aid, credit, trade considerations, and military
equipment will be an important factor affecting the U.S.
position in the 1S75 negotiations. Just as in 1970, Spain
is anticipated to request more than is expected, but this
time there may be more care in not being too forceful with
exorbitant demands. The American recession and tight federal
budget may force U.S. negotiators to walk away shaking their
heads and saying, "The price cannot be paid."
Money is only part of the expected cost for future use of
Spanish facilities. Other probable conditions for a base
agreement will be:
1. A security commitment which allows Spain to assume an
equal status in a mutual relationship. The dignity
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of Spain, the glory of the Franco regime, and the
demands of the military keep this high on the priority
list even though Spain is in no real military danger.
2. A greater Spanish presence at U.S. facilities. Since
the bases belong to Spain, integration of the forces
would be another means of acknowledgement of equality.
3. A greater voice in the actual missions fulfilled by the
resident military element. The present minor participa-
tion is unsatisfactory. The Polaris submarines present
a problem in that their mission will remain with the
United States even if it means their relocation to
preserve their singular dedication.
4
.
A treaty instead of an executive agreement in order to
more closely resemble the NATO alliance.
It will now be up to the United States to decide if the
basic rental fee can be afforded and whether the proper
formality can be given to convey a sense of equality and value
to Spain.
There are also many military factors which must be
evaluated before a policy on the bases can be formulated.
The air force and the navy are concerned about the preservation
of the Spanish bases and how they are used. Since the original
19 53 agreement, the following factors have been important in
the defense related policy decisions on base rights.
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1. The closing of bases such as Wheelus.
2. The conflicts in the Mid-East.
3. The growing size of the Soviet navy and their increased
presence in the Mediterranean.
4. The declining effectiveness and enthusiasm of NATO.
5. The change from basing strategic bombers in Spain to
establishing a ballistic missile submarine replenishment
site at Rota.
6. The range and technological advantages of strategic
missile systems Polaris, Poseidon, and the future
Trident.
7. The lack of port entry privileges for nuclear powered
vessels in the Mediterranean.
8. The changes in the size and composition of the U.S.
Sixth Fleet and the- associated supply and support
missions
.
9. The possibility of base relocation and the cost
effectiveness of each option.
The details involved in the above factors are generally
classified and, therefore, will not be discussed. It is
sufficient to say that when the Department of Defense
discusses Spanish base rights with the Department of State,
these topics will be important in arriving at a relative
value of the United States military presence in Spain as it
affects the American defense structure and the projection of
power. The State Department then must interface with Congress
and the President to arrive at a policy for future
negotiations
.
There must also be a plan which will outline possibilities
that could be used if negotiations fail to arrive at terms
which satisfy both nations. The question of base relocation
is indeed very complex, especially at a time when most nations
reject any foreign military presence regardless of the
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benefits. The ballistic missile submarine squadron at Rota
may be used as an example of the problems involved. Since
the submarine replenishment site is actually located on a
tender, it could be moved easily, but the permanent shore
facilities must remain according to the agreement. The
relocation of such a facility to another European port would
probably be very difficult to arrange. Two alternatives
include movement to Holy Loch, Scotland where the other
replenishment site is located, or move it to the continental
United States. The latter choice would be unfavorable
because of the long transit time to get on station; political
problems could prevent an increase of the United States
presence at Holy Loch.
The other military commands could relocate, but they
would be scattered to various other area bases; there would
be little hope of entire base movement. Commands and
functions would have to be combined and reorganized to fill
the gaps and absorb the excess. The Defense Department is
not anxious to expend time and resources to relocate the
United States facilities in Spain.
C. RECENT EVENTS
1 . Soviet Influence
Spain now has diplomatic or trade relations with
Romania, the German Democratic Republic, Cuba, Poland, and
recently the Peoples Republic of China. Negotiations for a
legation in the Soviet Union are presently underway. This
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thawing in the strict anti-communism policy during the last
five years seems to be in keeping with the trend of all
nations to increase communications between East and West.
Spain has been slow to respond and is still following a
relatively conservative policy.
In 1969 Senor Bravo negotiated an agreement with
Moscow which allowed Soviet support ships to take on
provisions in Las Palmas in the Canary Islands. These
vessels then supply combat ships in the area. A further
agreement in 19 70 provides for a merchant marine office in
Madrid. In 19 71, Moscow placed an order with the Spanish
shipping industry for the construction of two ocean rescue
tugs. The Soviet news agency TASS now has an office in
Madrid. [8 p. 15]
None of these agreements with the Soviet Union are
any threat to Western defense. The relations with the
communist nations are concerned with trade and increased
communication, both of which enhance Spain's position as a
leader. Spain is still very much a part of the West.
2 . Present Negotiations
The 1970 base rights agreement expires September 25,
1975. At this time the agreement may be renewed for another
five years. Negotiations to accomplish this began in
September 19 74 and are about to go into the third session in
Washington, D.C. The United States negotiation team is headed
by Ambassador at Large Robert McCloskey; Spain is represented
by the Foreign Minister Pedro Cortina.
124

On July 9, 1974 an accord on the basic principles of
the next agreement was initialed in Madrid by Secretary of
State Kissinger and Sr. Cortina. It was later signed by
President Nixon and the acting Head of State Juan Carlos.
In summary form, this was a statement that the United States
and Spain are agreed that the past 21 years of military
cooperation have served well the security of both nations
and the West, and it should be maintained.
The context of the declaration was not as important
as the timing of the publication and the Spanish demand that
it be signed by the highest level officials. In June 1974,
President Nixon signed a declaration of Atlantic Alliance
Principles in Brussels while on his way to the summit
conference in Moscow. The NATO alliance was celebrating its
25th anniversay. Therefore, it was an excellent time for
Spain to receive acknowledgement of equality with the NATO
nations as an important element in the defense of the West.
The United States made this concession to the Spanish pride
with the hope that it would speed up amicable agreement upon
the terms for extending the leases on the military facilities;
the effect will be seen in 1975.
The hypothesis that Spain has begun to integrate into
the European community is valid. Economic prosperity has
been the spearhead of the process which has continued even
under adverse political relations. Integration will probably
be part of Spain's future. The European acceptance of the
future Spanish political structure will be an important factor
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All of the future national goals of Spain may be achieved
through greater association with Europe. In particular,
economic prosperity and international equality, which are
important to all political elements of Spain, can be more
readily ensured through Europe than the United States. The
recent efforts of the Franco regime to liberalize internal
policies of Spain has promoted favorable responses from the
governments of Europe. As civil liberties and freedoms
increase, the political integration also increases. The
stability of the government and its institutions under army
guidance is also important in the projection of a national
image of continuity. When Franco dies, there will be close
international observation of the turnover of power. Since
the political power structure now in control will probably
remain in power, the trend toward international acceptance
and European integration is expected to continue.
It can therefore be concluded that the integration
of Spain into Europe will probably decrease the dependence T
on the United States as the power through which national
goals may be achieved. The changes of heads of state in the
European nations in 19 74 slowed down the change in dependence,
but there is no sign of reversal.
Relations with the United States will continue to be
important to Spain, but there will no longer be the dependence
that existed in 1953. Since 1968, Spain has been seeking a
much more independent role and has become more interested in
developing all options for fulfillment of national goals.
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All indicators of the possible foreign policy positions of a
post-Franco period lead toward an even greater association
with Europe with emphasis on political and economic
integration. Therefore, future United States military
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